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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
I. The Question 
 
Is it possible for extralegal action, or violence, to be reconciled with the rule of 
law? This is a question that intrudes upon the idea that, as Aristotle stated, “Law should 
govern.”1 In essence, the rule of law is supposed to exist to prevent, or to transition from, 
the arbitrary use of power and deployment of force. In the classical conception, per 
Aristotle,2 if the rule of law exists, then there need not be arbitrary action.  If we think of 
the rule of law in the foundational sense, then the foundation of a rule of law system can 
allow a society to transition from a state of nature, as we might think in the Hobbesian 
sense,3 to a state of order. This is not to suggest that violence ceases to exist, but that 
violence opposes the rule of law. The idea is that transitioning from a state of nature to a 
state of order allows society to rid itself of violence as a required aspect of the 
enforcement of the rule of law. What we must question is whether this is indeed the case. 
We can then think of the rule of law as an establishing principle of an ordered 
state. In other words, “when a society chooses to rule through law, it also chooses to 
subject itself to the constitutional principles of the rule of law… Law presupposes rule of 
                                                 
1
 Aristotle establishes a classical conception of the rule of law, that a set of legal principles and ideas, 
without arbitrariness, should govern society. This is one way in which the rule of law can be understood on 
a base level. We can read more into this idea, especially when speaking of the difference between rule by 
law versus rule of law. It can be argued that Aristotle’s concept of the rule of law is no more than what 
David Dyzenhaus would consider the rule by law. Politics: A Treatise on Government (Gloucester, UK: 
Dodo Press, 2007), 3.16 
2
 Aristotle, Politics 
3
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
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law…”4 The rule of law, then, is a framework by which a society orders itself around the 
law, a set of rules of principles.5 This is, in some ways, the principle upon which liberal 
democracies have been founded, and upon which liberal constitutionalism has operated. 
In the words of Montesquieu, “We are free because we live under civil laws.”6  
 A critical background assumption exists with respect to the rule of law: it is 
antithetical to arbitrary action,7 and as a subset of such action, by extension violence. 
This is a contrast that is no better expressed than by the following: “Our world affords no 
starker contrast than that between societies where peace generally prevails and those 
where violence is commonplace. The former are generally blessed with the rule of law; 
the latter cursed by its absence.” 8 The rule of law exists to curtail such things. In other 
words, “it is commonly argued that individual violence is prima facie immoral” because 
“it violates the prima facie obligation to obey the law.”9 In an ordered society, the 
assumption one lives by is to obey the law, and by extension, the rule of law. Violent or 
arbitrary action works in opposition to that obedience. 
 We first must admit that the rule of law and violence are intrinsically connected. 
In the very real-world sense, the rule of law is commonly instituted through violent 
action: revolution, war, violent collective action, etc. If we use the United States as an 
example, we can look not only at the Revolutionary War, but also subsequently the 
                                                 
4
 David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Berkeley: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2006), 254. 
5
 We can further see this as the case when looking at A.V. Dicey’s framework for the rule of law, which 
uses a set of principles upon which to think of the rule of law and its purpose. 
6
 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
7
 This idea is summed up nicely by F.A. Hayek in his Road to Serfdom when he notes that the rule of law 
“means that a government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand -- rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.” Friedrich A. Hayek, The 
Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 112. 
8
 Martin Krygier and Whit P. Mason, “Violence, Development and the Rule of Law,” UNSW Law Research 
Paper No. 2008-8 (March 2008), 1-35. 
9
 Jeffrie Murphy, "Violence and the Rule of Law," Ethics 80 (1970): 319. 
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American Civil War. Yet even accepting the use of violence as a means to the rule of law, 
we are left to question its existence within a supposedly normal state. It is within this 
context that I turn to the question of states of exception, for it is through states of 
exception that we can see the connection between, and extension of, the very problem 
and question I have previously posed, as to whether it is possible for the rule of law and 
violence to be reconciled. 
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II. The Rule of Law Through the State of Exception 
 
In the most basic sense, the state of exception stems from a concept that dictates 
that in times of crisis, the sovereign authority can suspend the constitution – and with it 
normal rule of law protections – in order to save the state. Thinking again in the 
American context, the oft-cited example is that of Abraham Lincoln, bravely doing 
everything in his power to “save the union,” 10 including suspending the right of habeas 
corpus and raising an army without the consent of Congress. 
 This inevitably leads to the idea that exceptional times call for exceptional 
measures, so to speak. And it is here that the rule of law and arbitrary action, or in this 
case, extralegal action, logically intersects. For at what time does the threat of arbitrary 
action become seemingly justifiable if not within an emergency, or crisis situation? And 
at what time does the rule of law face arguably justifiable exceptions? I will speak at 
more length of the state of exception later within Chapter 1, but suffice it to say that 
much of the current conversation concerning the relationship of arbitrary action to the 
rule of law takes place within the realm of state of exception literature. 
 It would seem antithetical to the concept of liberal constitutionalism that 
suspending the constitution – in essence, violating it – could allow you to in fact save the 
constitution. And yet theorists like Clinton Rossiter, Carl Schmitt, and arguably others 
                                                 
10
 Lincoln said, in a letter to Horace Greeley on 22 August 1862, that, “My paramount object in this 
struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union 
without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I 
could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that.” Another quote, likely 
apocryphal but nonetheless attributed to Lincoln, states something quite similar: “These rebels are violating 
the Constitution to destroy the Union. I will violate the Constitution if necessary to save the Union…” This 
was reportedly what Lincoln told then-Secretary of Treasury Salmon Porter Chase at one point. 
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like Bonnie Honig, believe that this is so.11 Schmitt in many ways provoked these ideas 
in his books Die Diktatur and Political Theology, arguing that liberalism and democracy 
are inadequate to dealing with constitutional crises.12 As such, he argued, a single 
sovereign dictator is required to respond to, and deal with, such crises. There are thinkers, 
however, that disagree with this assessment. Some, like David Dyzenhaus, argue that 
there is a certain adequacy to the rule of law in a normal, ordered state.13 In other words, 
the argument goes, we need not violate the rule of law in order to preserve the rule of law, 
even in exceptional or emergency times. 
 These are all issues that I will elaborate upon further, later in this thesis. As I will 
argue, there exists a background assumption that the rule of law first replaces violent or 
arbitrary action, and that second, that with an established rule of law system, such action 
is no longer required. But perhaps a better way to think of the relationship between the 
rule of law and violence may be as one of supplement. Jacques Derrida, in his famous 
essay Force of Law, speaks to the issue of the viability and enforceability of the law.14 
Without some sort of backing, some sort of force behind the law, it is meaningless. In 
times of emergency and crisis, this idea is simply exacerbated by virtue of the fact that 
that during such times, the rule of law tends to be on such tenuous, shaky ground. Maybe 
it is that the rule of law is actually not in opposition to extralegality, but also that it in fact 
                                                 
11
 Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (S.l.: 
Rossiter Press, 2008). 
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), The Concept of the Political (Chicago: Univ. Of Chicago Press, 2008), Dictatorship 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2010). 
Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) 
12
 I will speak more to this point in Chapter 1, but the basic argument surrounds the idea that “exceptional 
times call for exceptional measures,” and that the normal legal tools are inadequate to dealing with 
circumstances in crisis situations. 
13
 David Dyzenhaus, "Emergency, Liberalism, and the State," Perspectives on Politics 9 (2011): 69. 
14
 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 1990 
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requires some form of extralegal action in certain circumstances, even within a state with 
an established system of the rule of law. 
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III. The Argument 
 
 This problem, one of the possible requirement of violence or extralegality in order 
to back the rule of law, even outside of a so-called “state of nature” situation, is one that 
theorists from Clinton Rossiter to Giorgio Agamben have struggled with, only to 
seemingly come to no proper solution.15 Although I do not claim to come up with a 
solution, per se, I do believe that exploring avenues outside of simply examining the 
philosophical texts themselves is helpful to perhaps understanding and elucidating the 
issues at hand. Furthermore, I think that by exploring other places in which the 
relationship of the rule of law to states of exception is discussed and expressed can be an 
important complement to the straightforwardly philosophical texts, as well as perhaps 
enlightening the ways in which these issues face us in the world today. 
 This is especially true given the fact that since September 11, 2001, the United 
States has struggled with attempting to navigate the tricky position of balancing civil 
liberties and the rule of law with the argued need for exceptional measures. In this way, 
these themes of the rule of law, states of exception, and arbitrary action, though always of 
concern within liberal democratic states, is only the more so today. There is a timeliness 
to the discussion of such things. 
 Political and legal theorists regularly debate these issues, but the fact of the matter 
is that such writings are not the only method by which ideas about the rule of law, and 
states of exception, are explored. Film, for instance, is one such place. Thus, following 
                                                 
15
 See: Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University Of 
Chicago Press, 2005). 
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the lead of philosophers and political theorists like Robert Pippin and Joshua Dienstag,16 I 
turn two films in order to look more deeply at the interconnection between the rule of law 
and violence: John Ford’s late masterpiece, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962),17 
and Christopher Nolan’s recent superhero film, The Dark Knight (2008).18 Within them, 
we can see that in essence, if the transition to, or re-instating of, an ordered state requires 
a lawless act, or acts, inherently, then no stark dichotomy between the rule of law and 
violence can possibly exist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Robert B. Pippin, Hollywood Westerns and American Myth: The Importance of Howard Hawks and John 
Ford for Political Philosophy (New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010). 
Joshua Foa Dienstag, “A Storied Shooting:  Liberty Valance and the Paradox of Sovereignty.” 
17
 John Ford, Director, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, Paramount, 1962. 
18
 Christopher Nolan, Director, The Dark Knight, Warner Bros., 2008. 
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IV. The Dark Knight and Liberty Valance: My Reasoning 
 
 These two movies, in their own respective ways, delve deep into the ideas, as well 
as the questions, concerns, and ultimate problems surrounding states of exception and the 
rule of law that I have so far spoken of, as well as others that I will later speak about. In 
the approximately two-hour running time of each film, they do so with as much or more 
depth and nuance as many books on the subject. This alone should be reason enough to 
use them as the bases of this paper. And yet I realize that this approach is not traditional, 
and so requires justification. For this point, I turn mainly to Robert Pippin, a prominent 
Hegel scholar who in recent years has turned to film to explore the workings of political 
psychology in the United States. Pippin, I argue, offers a compelling argument for the use 
of film as a tool to dissect important issues of politics. 
 
Novels and films and other artworks are essential, not 
incidental or merely illustrative, elements of such a task. 
Most controversially of all, such interpretive work, in 
raising the question of the political actuality within which 
political philosophy would have a point, is itself 
philosophical work, not illustrative or merely preliminary 
… I shall assume that many twentieth-century films are the 
equal in aesthetic quality of any of these works in their 
ability to represent the fundamental problems of the human 
condition, especially our political condition and its 
psychological dimensions.19 
 
 
It seems to me apparent that great films like Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, 
Orson Welles’s Citizen Kane, and Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now, among many 
others, have a cultural significance and relevance that transcends the idea that film is 
simply an art for the masses used as a tool of entertainment, to become a medium through 
                                                 
19
 Pippin, Hollywood Westerns and American Myth, 15-17. 
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which we can enlighten ourselves to the world around us. Art like film can be as 
instructive and enlightening as the best writing of Plato, the greatest plays of Shakespeare, 
and I believe must be treated as such. Stanley Cavell makes a similar argument in his 
own exploration of “living a moral life.” He uses films to explore the issue of morality in 
our everyday lives, and stating that, “I take my examples of moral issues most 
systematically from their manifestation in the art of film.”20 I intend on doing much the 
same with regard to examples of the operation and mechanisms of the rule of law. 
But I am not interested in this context in providing meta-analysis of film, and the 
importance of film as a philosophical or political art form. I am primarily interested in 
two specific films, and in using them to elucidate the question I have posed. Accepting 
that they can – and should – be used for such purposes is what I ask of the reader. 
 Having established that film as an art form must be considered, especially in this 
case, I now turn to the question at hand: why do I choose to use these two specific films? 
Both Liberty Valance and The Dark Knight explore concepts related to both the rule of 
law and states of exception, such as the relationship of law to violence, the attempt to 
balance the rule of law with the need for security, and the nature of establishing and 
maintaining a rule-of-law system in the face of extra legality, among others. Liberty 
Valance is a hard case, in the sense that it does not deal directly with a traditional concept 
of the exception. It is concerned with the lawless zone of the frontier, a society more akin 
to Hobbes’ state of nature than to a proper state of exception in which the rule of law is 
being scaled back. However, the oppositional relationship at work between the Frontier 
and the States to the East offers a picture very similar in nature to the oppositional 
                                                 
20
 Stanley Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap, 2005), 9. 
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framework of the state of exception to that of the state of normalcy. By using this 
oppositional framework, the film establishes itself as a foundational myth of American 
history, and moreover, it explores the issues surrounding the establishment of a rule of 
law system from a system in which none previously existed. 
 The Dark Knight, by contrast, offers an easier case in that it paints a clear picture 
of the exception as it is traditionally thought, as well as elucidating the operation of the 
rule of law within such a state. It extends and in some ways expands upon the ideas set 
forth in Liberty Valance, but it further applies those ideas to the modern world. The Dark 
Knight’s clear focus on post-9/11 politics offers insight into my question as it relates to 
today’s world, rather than yesterday’s, as is the case with Liberty Valance. However, the 
combination of the two give a glimpse into the idea that once founded, the law is thought 
to replace violence. They further raise the question of whether the law does, indeed, 
replace violence. But more than The Dark Knight’s thematic relation to modern politics, 
the film forces us to ask the question of whether, having established a rule of law system, 
violence and extralegal measures must still in some circumstances be used, and in which 
circumstances they should be used. Finally, to put it in more succinct terms, “the film 
reflects a major challenge facing our democracy in a post-9/11 world – balancing the 
need for public safety with the protections of civil liberties.”21 After all, this is the 
essence of the state of exception and the efficacy of the rule of law within it. The Dark 
Knight explores these themes deeply as a piece of blockbuster entertainment as well as a 
piece of filmic art. 
 
                                                 
21
 Nickie D. Phillips, "The Dark Knight: Constructing Images of Good vs. Evil in an Age of Anxiety," 
(Bingley: Emerald, 2010), 30. 
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V. Robert Pippin’s Argument 
 
 I do not believe that the answer to my questions lies specifically within the 
writings of a few political theorists and reporters. I believe that, just as the conventional 
wisdom on thinking of the rule of law may not be adequate to understanding it, the 
conventional approach to learning about it may not be, either. Rather, I believe that it is 
within the realm of art, specifically of film, and more specifically, of the American 
Western, that we can truly begin to answer the questions I have posed here. In arguing 
this point, I have chosen to adopt, and to extend upon, the arguments made by Robert 
Pippin, who in his book Hollywood Westerns and American Myth,22 argues that the 
Western can not only be used to explore the political identity of the American polity, but 
furthermore, that it can be used to discuss the foundation of the American political. He 
states that “Being an American is essentially a political identification (political ideals are 
all that holds us together as a nation), but what is the content… of such an 
identification?”23 He explores certain aspects of this question throughout the book, and I 
set out to do the same to some extent. One of the distinct aspects of the Western is the 
idea of taming the Wild West, of bringing law and order to a lawless society. But within 
that, the concept that violence and illegality are inherent to that transition is a theme 
found throughout the Western. On the most basic level, everyone is familiar with the 
“Western revenge tale,” the showdown on the main street of town, or the shootout 
between the law and the outlaws. Yet these themes run deeper than the surface would 
suggest. 
                                                 
22
 Pippin, Hollywood Westerns and American Myth. 
23
 Pippin, Hollywood Westerns and American Myth, 63-64. 
  
 
13
VI. Extending on Pippin: The Frontier as the Exception 
 
 Pippin uses the Western to explore American identity, but in his examination of 
the Western, he is more concerned with a broad understanding of what the Western 
means for the United States as a polity. What he does not do, however, is directly 
confront the idea that the frontier can be thought of as analogous to a state of exception. 
Pippin does not concern himself with analyzing the intricacies of the Western as it relates 
to what can essentially be deemed a state of exception.24 If we understand the state of 
exception to be a state in which the legal principles and rule of law framework either 
ceases to exist, or does not exist as is commonly understood in a state of normalcy, then it 
is not a stretch to understand the frontier of the mythological American West to be in 
such a state. This is so because, as I will later elaborate in Chapters 1 and 2, the frontier 
of the West exists not only outside a normal legal order, but also in opposition to the legal 
order established in the East. Although the exception is most commonly described as 
being a mode in response to an emergency, i.e. war with a foreign power, the frontier as 
we see it in the great Westerns like The Searchers25 and The Man Who Shot Liberty 
Valance is positioned in opposition to the Eastern states. This is especially true in Liberty 
Valance.  
Moreover, there is a direct understanding that with statehood comes a legal 
framework that is simply not in place in the frontier environment. Yet as we see clearly in 
Liberty Valance, that lack of a normal legal framework is placed in direct opposition to 
the “state of normalcy” established in the East. In this sense we see a contrasting 
                                                 
24
 He does speak to the idea of one theme of the Western being “the end of the frontier,” but does not 
engage this directly, nor associate it specifically with states of exception conceptually. 
25
 John Ford, Director, The Searchers, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1956. 
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framework just as we do between a state of normalcy and one of emergency. We further 
see the attempt at transitioning from that frontier, or exceptional state, to one of order and 
rule of law, as comes from the East. Giorgio Agamben makes an astute point in his State 
of Exception when he discusses the border between the legal and the political. In the same 
sense that the state of exception itself can (and perhaps should) be understood based 
around the metaphorical border between the legal and the political, 26 then the very real 
border of the frontier against the state, and the legal and political ramifications of the two 
in relation to each other become all the more clear, and all the more compelling. 
 But in order to look at these ideas within the films as I have laid out, we must first 
understand the state of exception as it is conventionally understood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Agamben, State of Exception. 
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CHAPTER 1 
“A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION” 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0 What is the State of Exception? 
 
 What is the state of exception? In essence, it is a time in which the State faces 
some threat of mortal peril, and so uses exceptional measures to restore order, or the state 
of normalcy. Some famous cases from the United States include Abraham Lincoln’s 
suspension of habeas corpus during the civil war.27 In a nutshell, the state of exception 
can be thought of in these terms: 
 
The situation in which a state is confronted by a mortal 
threat and responds by doing things that would never be 
justifiable in normal times, given the working principles of 
that state. The state of exception uses justifications that 
only work in extremis, when the state is facing a challenge 
so severe that it must violate its own principles to save 
itself.28 
 
 
This idea of the state of exception boils down to one basic idea: sometimes, governments 
face great peril. In those times, the normal working order cannot handle the emergency 
facing said government, and as a result, must employ methods that they would not 
                                                 
27
 In a Letter to Horace Greeley on August 22, 1862, Lincoln wrote that, “If I could save the Union without 
freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could 
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the 
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otherwise use. As one simple example: the use of torture is normally considered 
inherently antithetical to an ordered state and the rule of law. Yet within a state of 
exception, such action may not only be required, but is also considered legitimate 
because the situation is one of emergency. 
The concept of the state of exception has arguably been around since the seeds of 
Republican government in the Roman Empire. In his book Constitutional Dictatorship, 
Clinton Rossiter looks through history at the various ways in which governments have 
used so-called “constitutional means” to suspend their democratic values and appoint 
dictators in times of emergency.29 Of particular interest is Rossiter’s chapter on “The 
Roman Dictatorship.” The Roman Dictatorship was in essence a constitutionally 
appointed dictator who had power specifically during times of emergency or rebellion in 
the state. As Rossiter explains, “Aristotle tells in his Politics of an elective tyranny 
designed to restore law and order in a state which has been weakened by factional strife 
or depredations of a neighboring power.”30 The Romans had a rule in their Republic that 
specifically allowed for a Consul to appoint a dictator, given unilateral power, to deal 
with such situations of “strife or depredations of a neighboring power.” In time of 
rebellion, or war with a foreign foe, there was in place a mechanism by which the 
Romans could suspend their own government in favor of complete executive authority. 
The caveat was that such a dictator could only stay in power for six months, until the 
emergency had been dealt with, or until the Consul who appointed him resigned his own 
post. “The Roman dictator was appointed in a time of grave emergency to address the 
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concrete specifications of that crisis and no other,”31 and “as soon as his commission was 
carried out his office similarly came to an end.”32 This is what Carl Schmitt would later 
refer to as “commissarial dictatorship,” which I will later elaborate further. In this sense, 
the idea of a suspension of normal legal frameworks when an existential emergency 
befalls the state has existed at least in theory, if not in practice, since the advent of early 
pseudo-liberal governmental systems.  
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1.1 A Brief History of the Exception 
 
 It is also clear that in the formulation of modern liberal democracies, mechanisms 
for emergencies of various types in various cases have also been implemented. This is 
especially true of the twentieth century. One example is the French État de Siège [State of 
Siege], which is their equivalent of the state of emergency. It was originally conceived 
during the French Revolution, and since has been evoked or reformulated through the 
years, from the Directorial law of August 27, 1797 to Napoleon’s decree of December 24, 
1811, up through to the Twentieth Century when, as Giorgio Agamben explains, “On 
August 2, 1914, President Poincaré issued a decree that put the entire country in a state of 
siege, and this decree was converted into law by parliament two days later. The state of 
siege remained in force until October 12, 1919.”33  
Furthermore, the Fifth French Republic adopted its Constitution in 1958, which 
had explicit guidelines for the state of siege. Article 36 of the Constitution of 1958 has 
provisions for how the government is supposed to act during such a time, but Article 16 
gives the President greatly expanded powers.34 Although the State of Siege has rarely 
been invoked, one time in which it was done officially was in 1961 during the Algerian 
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 Agamben, State of Exception, 12. 
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 As it states in Article 36, “Lorsque les institutions de la République, l'indépendance de la Nation, 
l'intégrité de son territoire ou l'exécution de ses engagements internationaux sont menacés d'une manière 
grave et immédiate et que le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics constitutionnels est interrompu, 
le Président de la République prend les mesures exigées par ces circonstances, après consultation officielle 
du Premier ministre, des Présidents des Assemblées ainsi que du Conseil constitutionnel.” [“When the 
institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of her territory or the execution of 
her international commitments are threatened in a grave and immediate manner and the normal functions of 
the public constitutional powers are interrupted, the President of the Republic can take exceptional measure 
as a result of these circumstances after official consultation of the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the 
Assembly, and the Constitutional Council.”] 
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War.35 Regardless of whether it is rarely invoked, the overall point one can draw from 
this is twofold.  
Firstly, the power exists within what is considered a liberal democratic state to 
suspend the liberal democratic framework of the state in a time of emergency, granting 
the President expanded authority. Additionally, because the power has been invoked, if 
even once, and if even for a short period of time, the precedent is in place for such action 
to take place in the future. In the words of David Dyzenhaus, “with a continuing tendency 
in all of the Western democracies, the declaration of the state of exception has gradually 
been replaced by an unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the 
normal technique of government.”36 
 England has a history with the state of exception as well, though slightly different. 
The comparison made between the state of exception and England is its policy of martial 
law. As Clinton Rossiter notes however, comparing martial law to France’s state of siege, 
a crisis government of the nature of “the state of siege is now an accepted element of the 
British Constitution.”37 He goes on to describe the way in which emergency government 
had operated for most of English history. The earliest example of expanded executive 
authority in England is perhaps the Riot Act of 1714, which many know by its colloquial 
usage, “reading the Riot Act.” What the act allowed the government (through the name of 
the King) to do was proclaim that rioters disperse. If they refused to do so after an hour, 
the government could then arrest and jail them. But this was a simple preamble to the 
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development of a number of acts, laws, decrees and statutes that eventually led to the 
concept of martial law through English common law.  
Just as the state of siege in France arose through the threat of invasion or 
insurrection, so too did martial law. “The same procedures are followed: suspension of 
civil rights, institution of military courts for civilian crimes, substitution of the military 
arm for the regular police.”38 Rossiter, however, does not continue the comparison, 
noting the differences in the two political and governmental systems that gave rise to 
each institution in their respective countries.  
Furthermore, as Carl Schmitt notes, “Despite the name it bears, martial law is 
neither a right nor a law in this sense, but rather a proceeding guided essentially by the 
necessity of achieving a certain end.”39 Martial law, however, is quite a nebulous 
institution. It is not, as with the state of siege, directly legislated through the constitution. 
Rather, it exists through an amalgamation of acts, decrees, and precedent in common law. 
One such act is the Emergency Powers Act, which was passed during World War I.  
Article 1 gave the King or Queen the authority to “declare that a state of 
emergency exists”40 Article 2 expands that authority further, giving the executive the 
“powers and duties… necessary for the preservation of the peace.”41 The concept of 
emergency powers is more vague, but nonetheless established, in England. Precedence in 
the country accepts the idea that desperate times call for desperate measures, so to speak. 
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As Sir Matthew Hale stated, “It is not a law, but something rather indulged than allowed 
as a law… and that only in cases of necessity.”42 
Arguably the most important example in this brief rundown of modern states of 
exception is the Weimar Government in Germany. More specifically, Article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution. It is notorious largely for being considered the precursor to Nazi 
Germany. Carl Schmitt, a Nazi and a lawyer who argued vociferously for the idea of 
emergency powers, the state of emergency, essentially wrote the playbook for the Nazi 
use of such action, tied to his writings on the subject to Article 48. As Agamben argues, 
“it is impossible to understand Hitler’s rise to power without first analyzing the uses and 
abuses of this article in the years between 1919 and 1933.”43 I am not concerned with the 
rise of Nazi Germany, and simply use this as an illustrative point for the way in which 
Article 48 was used, as well as its notoriety and connection to the state of exception. 
Further, it was illustrative of the rule of law’s place within the exception from a practical 
standpoint. The theoretical aspects of the exception can be directly tied to this. Article 48 
states the following: 
 
If security and public order are seriously disturbed or 
threatened in the German Reich, the president of the Reich 
may take the measures necessary to reestablish security and 
public order, with the help of the armed forces if required. 
To this end he may wholly or partially suspend the 
fundamental rights established in Articles 114, 115, 117, 
118, 123, 124, and 153.44 
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It is abundantly clear simply from reading this passage how inevitable, at least in 
hindsight, the eventual abuse of the article was. It literally gives full power to the 
president, or executive, to decide whether there is an emergency, and upon deciding so, to 
fully suspend fundamental rights afforded through the constitution. As a result, the rule 
of law ceases to operate as it normally should, or traditionally does in a liberal 
constitutional democracy. These points cannot be emphasized enough. 
Although in the other examples I have given from France and England show some 
room for maneuver, as well as giving limits based on the separation of powers inherent 
within each respective system, in the Weimar Republic, because of Article 48, no such 
limits technically existed. If the President decided that an emergency was in place, he 
could simply revoke citizens’ fundamental rights, blatantly trampling the very essence of 
the rule of thought as it is traditionally thought to exist. To compare this to the United 
States, imagine if, when Congress gave George W. Bush “all necessary force” against 
those he deemed responsible for 9/11, that declaration constitutionally enabled him to 
suspend the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, it is perhaps prudent to consider Carl Friedrich’s 
point concerning martial rule, stating, 
 
The concept of martial rule is understandable only in terms 
of the rule of law which it replaces. Where this rule of law 
is taken to be the core of the legal system, because it alone 
guarantees a calculable stability of legal relationships, an 
emergency is essentially a condition of things which 
threatens the continued maintenance of this rule of law.45 
 
This is the heart of the problems we face when considering the concepts of states of 
exception and emergency measures. Emergency measures in the vein of martial law, state 
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of siege, or other similar policies, “replace,” or supersede the rule of law’s normally 
sustained protections. 
We are essentially asking ourselves to consider the replacement of legal norms 
with something else. What that “something else” is depends on a number of factors, but 
the end result is the same. The rule of law no longer applies in the exception as it does in 
the norm. Weimar, and these questions as a whole, forces us to consider the lengths to 
which emergency powers can be appropriated to disrupt the rule of law. 
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1.2 Investigating the Theories 
 
 Although I do not wish to minimalize the amount to which variation exists within 
the literature on the state of exception, I will, for the purposes of this thesis, classify 
thinkers based on a simple analytic dichotomy. In some ways, we can think in terms of 
either siding with Schmitt, or against Schmitt. Although I understand that Schmitt is not 
as simplistic and this might suggest, the thrust of my point is this: Schmitt’s writings on 
the state of exception have essentially shaped the way in which thinking and literature on 
the exception has been dealt with. What we must then ask is: does a given writer 
approach the concept of the exception under Schmittian terms or not? A capitulation to 
Schmitt, in essence, equals an acceptance of his basic framework. 
 As a basic example of my overall point, let us look at Clinton Rossiter. His book 
Constitutional Dictatorship, does not seriously engage Schmitt, but although it is a legal 
history, not specifically a text of political philosophy, Rossiter is inadvertently working 
within Schmitt’s framework. Within the book, he proposes an “emergency constitution” 
that would enable a dictatorial regime during an emergency. In this sense, he accepts that 
the exception is against the norm. Otherwise, why propose a constitution for emergency 
times as well as keeping a constitution for normal times? 
 By contrast, thinkers like Giorgio Agamben argue that the exception has become 
the norm. And in the same basic respect, David Dyzenhaus believes that one need not 
enable exceptional measures to deal with emergency times.46 Although not a direct 
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acceptance of Agamben’s overall point, it is certainly related to the point I am making 
here, which is that there is a blurred line between the exception and the norm, and as such, 
the rule of law and violence do not exist in such an oppositional framework as one might 
at first believe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
executive action be authorized by law, but also that all executive action is subject to the control of the rule 
of law…” Dyzenhaus, Emergency, Liberalism, and the State, 70. 
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1.3 A Basic Framework: Looking at Schmitt and Rossiter 
 
Schmitt famously stated that, “the sovereign is he decides on the exception.” The 
exception, according to Schmitt, was the ability of the sovereign to suspend the rule of 
law if crisis were to befall the state. He saw this as intrinsic to modern democratic 
systems. If a liberal state suspends the rule of law during an emergency, Schmitt 
theorized, it inherently ceased to be a liberal state. This is arguably the most troubling 
point of all, because given the historical dependence of emergency measures by liberal 
democracies throughout the Twentieth century, and now even more so in the Twenty-first, 
Schmitt’s assertion, if true, would dismantle the very concept of our very own political 
system as that which we believe it to be: free.  
From a liberal-legalistic standpoint, David Dyzenhaus sums up Schmitt succinctly 
when he notes that for Schmitt, “even when liberals recognize that an emergency is a 
state of exception to regular norms and principles, they do not have the theoretical 
resources to cope with such an exception,” and goes on to summarize that,  
 
On his account, liberalism, to remain consistent, must refuse to 
countenance an extralegal measures model. As a result, when a 
liberal state responds to existential threats, protections for 
individual liberty associated with the rule of law will become ever 
more attenuated, until the point where the rule of law is reduced to 
the executive’s claim that it has a valid or purely formal 
authorization for its actions. At that point, liberal legalism ceases 
to be liberal.47 
 
 
Most modern political theorists have for the most part accepted Schmitt’s claim, even if 
they do not directly reference his theories with regard to him (Clinton Rossiter, for 
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example, seems to simply gloss over Schmitt48), and so we must consider and engage his 
ideas.  
But what makes those ideas so troubling comes from the fact that he essentially 
accepts the idea that within a state of exception, the law has no proper place. In Schmitt’s 
own words, the state of exception “subtract[s] itself from any consideration of law.”49 
This is the crux of the discussion on the state of exception: if the exception is used to 
preserve the state, yet exists outside of the legal norms of the state, how can the state in 
fact be preserved if its own norms must be violated to preserve it? In other words, is it 
possible to violate the constitution in order to preserve the constitution? Is not 
dictatorship antithetical to the idea of a democratic state? Schmitt’s argument rests on 
what would appear to be a paradoxical claim. And yet that paradoxical claim has been 
widely accepted, not only by modern political theorists, but also in the practices of 
modern democratic governments. In Schmitt’s first writing on the dictator and the state of 
emergency, Die Diktatur, he seems to endorse the idea of using the dictatorship as a 
means to an end. He holds the Roman emergency model in high regard, differentiating 
between “commissarial” and “sovereign” dictatorship. 
 Commissarial dictatorship is the Roman model, as I have spoken of previously, in 
which a consul appoints a dictator when an emergency situation befalls the state, and then 
subsequently steps down upon the resolution of the emergency. Sovereign dictatorship is 
different in Schmitt’s mind, and he takes issue with the conflation of the two. To him, 
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sovereign dictatorship is differentiated from commissarial in the fact that a sovereign 
dictator has absolute authority, and does not exist as a means to an end. Whereas a 
commissarial dictator is appointed by another, his power checked, and his appointment 
temporal – in the Roman framework, a maximum of six months of time, a sovereign 
dictator has no such checks or limits. His power is as he proclaims it to be. The sovereign 
dictator can be thought of in a modern sense as that of a modern-day dictator, such as 
Hitler and Stalin. “Dictatorship hence suspends that by which it is justified, the state of 
law, and imposes instead the rule of a procedure interested exclusively in bringing about 
a concrete success… [a return to] the state of law.”50 Schmitt’s original conception of the 
exception was the standard framework of returning to the “state of law” after the 
emergency has subsided. But later, Schmitt’s reformulation of his theory seemingly 
reveals him siding with the idea not of commissarial dictatorship, but sovereign 
dictatorship. His famous words, “the sovereign is he who decides on the exception” from 
Political Theology reveal a clear shift in his thinking on the subject.  
Furthermore, John P. McCormack points out, “Schmitt explicitly and deliberately 
conflates the two decisions: the sovereign ‘decides whether there is an extreme 
emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it’” (emphasis added).51 In essence, 
the dictator becomes the sole decider and the sole executor of the powers of the 
government. McCormack notes Schmitt’s shift, laying out the following: 
 
–Die Diktatur (1921) 
exception: dangerous, not good; must be met with technical 
exactitude and temporal finitude by a defined quasi-
charismatic commissarial dictator 
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normal order: rule of law; normatively valued; worth 
restoring. 
 
–Political Theology (1922) 
exception: dangerous but good because an occasion for 
revivification; must be met by ambiguously sovereign 
dictator 
normal order: formally scientistic legality; abstract and 
lifeless; worth restoring but in need of reenlivening.52 
 
 
What this shows us is a deeper understanding of the state of exception, and furthermore, 
the operation of the rule of law within the exception. Even though we see a shift in 
Schmitt’s own thinking, it is of little true concern to me. What is of concern, however, is 
the way that we see Schmitt regards the exception in relation to the rule of law. 
 Essentially, through the exception, we are able to see deeper aspects of the rule of 
law than can normally be seen within a state of normalcy. In the normal state, it is 
supposed to exist in a traditional conception,53 but the exception reveals the feebleness 
that the rule of law actually holds, per its intrinsic connection to violence.  
According to Schmitt, the normal order is not constructed in such a way as to 
allow for a proper and adequate response to any given emergency. “A regime with 
institutional diversity… what is more generally known as the separation of powers… 
inevitably paralyzes a state in the face of an exception because it obscures who is 
sovereign, who must decide and act at that moment.”54 In his own words, he asks, “Who 
assumes authority concerning those matters for which there are no positive 
stipulations…? In order words, who is responsible for that for which competence has not 
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been anticipated?”55 Democracy then, with its checks and balances, is inherently 
inadequate for dealing with emergency situations. They are not able to respond swiftly 
enough to sudden or unexpected emergencies that befall the state. Rossiter makes the 
same basic argument when speaking of the American governmental system, believing 
that because it works so slowly, if and when emergencies befall the United States, there is 
no adequate way of responding.  
Do Schmitt and Rossiter have a point? It is certainly true that separation of 
powers in the United States makes things move much slower than they might otherwise. 
But are we to understand that those checks and balances work against, rather than in 
favor of, democracy? Rossiter’s point boils down to the fact that the executive already 
uses emergency powers. Why should we not make such powers constitutionally 
legitimate? At least then we would have a way of managing, or checking, the power of 
the executive. But the reason behind his book is to argue that dictatorship can and should 
be a part of liberal democratic states. He makes us ask, if the “dictatorship” is 
constitutionally enabled, is it not also democratically legitimate? Rossiter, in approaching 
the question in such a way, inadvertently (and yet inevitably) capitulates to Schmitt’s 
claim. Although he would argue that because such a dictatorship is constitutionally 
enabled, it avoids the trappings of creating lawlessness from lawfulness, I would question 
such a stance.  
Bruce Ackerman, in his book Before The Next Attack, raises the same questions 
that Rossiter does, but from a post-9/11 position.56 Civil liberties are regularly ignored, 
suspended, or destroyed during emergency situations. What can we do to prevent that 
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from happening? Ackerman’s proposal is an emergency constitution that would allow for 
the executive to act with a certain sovereign authority, but that over time that authority 
would be diminished in order to return to a state of normalcy. Does such a plan in fact 
solve for the problems inherent within the state of exception? Or does it, as Dyzenhaus 
might argue, lead us down the road to more abuses and an extended period of 
“exceptional times”? 
And what of the rule of law’s relation to these questions? Would an “emergency 
constitution” solve for the relation the rule of law has to violence? And if that violence is 
seen as working against the rule of law, does such a proposal in fact make much of a 
difference? Perhaps it would be better to think of these questions not as ones that have 
answers, but as ones that raise the need for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of 
the rule of law as it relates to our own political lives. 
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1.4 The Friend-Enemy Distinction: The Rule of Opposition 
 
 The last point to be made about Schmitt concerns that of the “friend-enemy 
distinction.” It is within this concept that we can perhaps better formulate an idea not 
only of why Schmitt attaches himself to the concept of emergency dictatorship, but also 
as to why there is such a clear and consistent capitulation to Schmitt’s terms across the 
spectrum of political theorists. Schmitt argues that we can define the political, and by 
extension define the state, based upon an idea of contrasts and opposites. Who do we 
define ourselves against? This, in essence, is the “friend-enemy distinction.”57 He further 
argues that “the friend and enemy concepts are to be understood in their concrete and 
existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols… An enemy exists only when, at least 
potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.”58 Schmitt 
is not concerned with the idea one might make that “poverty is the enemy,” or hunger, or 
some other abstract concept. What is of importance to him is the idea that a nation would, 
and should, define itself in opposition to something else. “In its entirety the state as an 
organized political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction.”59  
What we can take from this is twofold. Firstly, a state defines its own “enemy.” 
Secondly, the friend-enemy distinction is definitional of a political entity. A state without 
such a distinction ceases to be a political entity. The importance of this concept is far-
reaching in today’s political sphere, from the way in which the United States approaches 
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the “War on Terror” to the way that we as citizens define ourselves in the world. The 
obvious application of the friend-enemy distinction is during a war. Take World War II, 
in which there was a clear enemy – The Nazis, Fascists, and Imperialists. Or even during 
the Civil War, in which the North defined itself in opposition to the South, and vice-versa 
The Cold War is another, in which the United States positioned itself as the champion of 
democracy and capitalism, in opposition to Communism. Moreover, even if not explicitly 
a policy of Western democracies, there was a clearly geographical opposition between 
the West and the East. The question becomes how we define ourselves since the Cold 
War. Some believe that since the end of the Cold War, we have been searching for a new 
“enemy,” and the “war on terror” in a response to that.60 
 This is not a concept only espoused by Schmitt, and is one that has been applied 
in the realm of international relations. Engaging fully with the international relations 
literature on this count is beyond the scope of this project. Nonetheless, some of the 
theories with regard to this specific line of thinking are directly relevant to my point 
above. As David Campbell argues in his book, Writing Security, “Identity is an 
inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it. Inescapable as it is, identity 
– whether personal or collective – is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by 
intentional behavior. Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference.”61 How we 
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define ourselves is directly related to what we feel we are opposed to. Politics, like 
anything else in life, can be thought of in a simple oppositional relationship. Good vs. 
evil, right vs. wrong, beautiful vs. ugly, smart vs. stupid.62 Or even, as George W. Bush 
stated, “you’re with us or against us.” Campbell’s point, therefore, is a logical extension 
of Schmitt’s in the sense that it engages the essence of the political based on an 
oppositional relationship of the nation to an “other.” Campbell is directly engaging 
Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, even if he does not directly invoke Schmitt’s name. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of 
boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from an “other,” a “domestic” 
from a “foreign.” This precise thinking is tied directly to the Schmittian theory of the friend-enemy 
distinction, as well as a direct extension on it. Just as Schmitt draws on Hagel’s idea of difference being 
definitional (in aesthetics, beautiful/ugly), and that definition being intrinsic to the political, Campbell here 
uses the “difference” factor to elucidate how a difference to an “other” defines a polity. 
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1.5 Black Holes and Grey Holes: Dyzenhaus and the Rule of Law 
 
 Before I go on a tangent however, let us turn to David Dyzenhaus, whom I have 
cited above. Dyzenhaus, a legal and political scholar, has written at length on the state of 
exception. He is also quite clear in his objection to the standard mode of thinking on the 
subject, saying, “…a response to emergencies, real or alleged, should be governed by the 
rule of law.”63 This point is clear. He believes that even in an emergency, the mechanisms 
of the norm are sufficient to handling and dealing with said emergency. There is no real 
need to create a “constitutional dictatorship” as Clinton Rossiter proposes, and in fact, 
Dyzenhaus is quite critical of such a proposition. But Dyzenhaus uses Rossiter as a 
means to an end, explaining, “Rossiter’s difficulties here illustrate rather than solve the 
tensions in the idea of constitutional dictatorship.”64  
The problem that Dyzenhaus correctly identifies is the apparent need during 
emergencies to take measures outside of the norm, and yet at the same time uphold the 
rule of law. In response to both Rossiter and Ackerman, Dyzenhaus states that, “Even as 
they attempt to respond to Schmitt’s challenge, they seem to prove the claim that Schmitt 
made… that law cannot effectively enshrine a distinction between constitutional 
dictatorship and dictatorship.”65 If this is true, then how does Dyzenhaus deal with what 
he feels others have either failed to deal with, or have done to an inadequate degree? He 
has two arguments that I am going to specifically address. The first is his distinction 
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between what he calls “legal black holes” and “legal gray holes.”66 The second is his 
contrast between rule of law and rule by law. Both of these arguments rely on a certain 
subtlety, as well as a certain parsing of concepts, but both provide essential insight into 
how we may deal with the apparent need for rule of law protections while at the same 
time recognizing the need for extenuating circumstances. 
 A “legal black hole” is essentially, the way in which the state of exception is 
commonly thought of existing. In other words, there is no proper or functioning legal 
apparatus to speak of. The rule of law simply ceases to be, and arguably even 
conceptually, it is nothing more than an afterthought. In comparison, “a grey hole is a 
legal space in which there are some legal constraints on executive action – it is not a 
lawless void – but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit 
government to do as it pleases.”67 Although one might at first believe that having even 
some legal constraints on the executive would be a good thing, Dyzenhaus actually 
argues that grey holes may be worse, simply because they “permit the government to 
have its cake and eat it too,”68 allowing the executive to not only infringe upon civil 
liberties and subvert the rule of law, but give the façade that rule of law protections are in 
fact still in place. An example from recent memory would be that of Guantanamo Bay, in 
which the Bush Administration not only detained individuals indefinitely, but argued that 
it was doing so legally, and within the parameters of not only the constitution, but the 
spirit of the law. Does this mean that it is better to have no protections than some 
protections? He does state that “grey holes cause more harm to the rule of law than black 
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holes,”69 but I am not sure that he would argue that it is better to have no protections. 
Rather, the dangers inherently in a system in which a façade of legality exists is more 
insidious than one in which we accept that legality does not exist. Regardless, what is 
important in this distinction between black and grey holes is that they are two distinct 
ways of thinking about the state of exception. 
 We can then say that a black hole is “a space devoid of rule-of-law controls,” and 
a grey hole being “a space in which there are some rule-of-law controls.”70 Dyzenhaus 
argues that although it may be common sense to think that a black hole, with no rule of 
law controls, would be a greater problem, in fact a grey hole, where there are some is 
worse. Why? The explanation is simple: they have the potential to lead (perhaps even 
quite easily) to making the exception normal. It could, in fact, lead to a perpetual state of 
exception. This is the point to keep in mind when I later discuss Agamben, as it is in this 
concept of a “perpetual state of exception” that Dyzenhaus and Agamben align. 
 The second point to which I draw on Dyzenhaus is in his distinction between the 
rule of law and the rule by law. If we think of the rule of law as a rule not only backed by 
the legislative, executive, and judicial authority, but also through the spirit of the law, and 
the concept of the constitution of the state, then the rule by law is one in which law, as a 
physical legislative authority, rules. It is a subtle distinction, and Dyzenhaus uses it to 
speak of judicial decisions, the way in which a judge decides on a given case. But I 
believe the concept of differentiating the two has further reaching applications.  
Are the laws that we abide by in the spirit of the constitution and the rule of law 
as a philosophical and cultural concept? This question directly ties into the films I will be 
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discussing, specifically the idea of justification – or lack there of – for that which seems 
illegal. Can an action be upheld by the rule of law, even while it disregards the rule by 
law? Furthermore, if the law no longer operates properly as it does in a state of normalcy, 
and devolves into a legal black hole, in what way should we approach it? Should the rule 
of law be the guiding principle, or is the rule by law sufficient to a well-ordered society? 
Rule by law seems to hold with it an inherently arbitrary undertone. Laws can be made 
that are unjust and do not, in essence, follow the rule of law. Is it possible that some 
actions, despite working against the rule by law, can work in the spirit of the rule of law? 
In thinking of these questions, Giorgio Agamben might be helpful, mostly because of the 
frightening, but compelling point he makes regarding the state of exception in modern 
times. If the exception has become the norm, where does that leave us? 
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1.6 Giorgio Agamben and the Exception as the Norm 
 
Agamben’s basic argument boils down to two main points: the exception has 
become the norm, and as such, the state (as applied to most modern democracies) has 
become a “permanent state of exception.” As he himself notes, “the state of exception 
tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary 
politics.”71 He argues that, whereas originally, specific exceptional cases were applied in 
order to deal with crises of the state, those exceptional cases have been instituted not only 
as legal precedents, but also as orders that carry the “force of law,”72 thus blurring the 
line between the exception and the norm. It is frightening because this is applicable to 
most modern democracies across the world, including the United States. Agamben makes 
this point clear at the outset with regard to the USA Patriot Act, “What is new about 
President Bush’s order is that it radically erases any legal status of the individual 
[suspected of terrorism], thus producing a legally unnamable and unclassifiable being,” 
but that further more, “they are the object of a pure de facto rule.”73 They are not 
governed by the rule of law outside of a “de facto” rule of law. This connects directly to 
Agamben’s point concerning decrees and dictates that hold the force of law.  
He differentiates between legislative law, and executive orders that, in essence, 
carry the same power and weight that a legislative act is supposed to carry. Think, for 
example, when Franklin Roosevelt said in his inaugural address that in order to deal with 
the Great Depression 
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With this pledge taken, I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of 
this great army of our people dedicated to a disciplined attack upon 
our common problems… I am prepared under my constitutional 
duty to recommend the measures that a stricken nation in the midst 
of a stricken world may require. These measures, or such other 
measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and 
wisdom, I shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring to 
speedy adoption. But in the event that the Congress shall fail to 
take one of these two courses, and in the event that the national 
emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty 
that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one 
remaining instrument to meet the crisis--broad Executive power 
to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that 
would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign 
foe.74 
 
 
Agamben’s point is that such a statement, although not itself law, acts as such, and carries 
the force of such, if not in the strictly physical sense, then at least in the symbolic one. 
Furthermore, although he makes clear that President Lincoln arguably had no authority to 
suspend habeas corpus, and certainly none to raise an army, that his decrees to do so 
acted as such. As a result, what under normal circumstances would be meaningless, in a 
state of exception acts no differently than a Congressional act.  
Agamben’s original point that the exception has become the norm is even more 
compelling in light of this fact, when coupled with the context of the United States. Think 
of such simple, now-routine executive powers such as executive orders and signing 
statements. Certainly George W. Bush used signing statements to completely ignore acts 
of Congress. Furthermore, even if Congress chooses to fund certain programs, an 
executive order can easily force the executive offices (such as the FBI, EPA, DHS, etc.) 
to simply not use funds allocated for certain functions. “But law-decrees now constitute 
the normal form of legislation… this means that the democratic principle of the 
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separation of powers has today collapsed and that the executive power has in fact, at least 
partially, absorbed the legislative power.”75 What we see as a result of all of this is a 
complete confusion of the rule of law within modern American government. If we accept 
Agamben’s point at face value – and certainly, it is compelling enough to do so – then we 
are in troubling times indeed. 
 In his State of Exception, Agamben goes into great detail about Carl Schmitt’s 
theories. I have examined some of that through this chapter, especially in opposition to 
thinkers like Schmitt and Rossiter. But one point upon which I have not touched strongly 
is that of the force of law, which Agamben uses by drawing upon Jacques Derrida’s 
famous essay.76 Derrida makes a point that is intricately connected to my question, 
posing the following: 
 
How are we to distinguish between this force of the law, 
this “force of law”… and the violence that one always 
deems unjust? What difference is there between, on the one 
hand, the force that can be just, or in any case deemed 
legitimate, not only an instrument in the service of the law 
but the practice and even the realization, the essence of 
droit, and on the other hand the violence that one always 
deems unjust? What is a just force or a non-violent force?77 
 
Derrida realizes the inherent problem within concepts of law and justice, and 
acknowledges the paradox at stake. The law requires a force, the force requires some kind 
of violence, and violence is thought inherently unjust. Agamben confronts Derrida’s 
claim by discussing the applicability of the law. He argues that the “force of law” is 
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something “mystical,” and that it is “an indeterminate element that can be claimed both 
by the state authority… and by a revolutionary organization…”78 The application of such 
force within the exception is what confounds Agamben, and his summary is slightly more 
confounding still: 
 
In this sense, the state of exception is the opening of a state 
in which application and norm reveal their separation and a 
pure force-of-law realizes (that is, applies by ceasing to 
apply) a norm whose application has been suspended. In 
this way, the impossible task of welding a norm and reality 
together, and thereby constituting the normal sphere, is 
carried out in the form of the exception, that is to say, by 
presupposing their nexus. This means that in order to apply 
a norm it is ultimately necessary to suspend its application, 
to produce an exception. In every case, the state of 
exception marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur 
with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to 
realize an enunciation without any real reference.79 
 
Agamben’s rhetoric is confusing, but it is not impossible to understand the overall point 
he is espousing. It is ultimately impossible to apply a norm of the law without suspending 
its application. In other words, there is an intrinsic connection between the norm of the 
law and the exception to the law. In this sense, Agamben fully realizes the overall 
message: the line between norm and exception are blurred, and their connection, or 
“nexus” is inherent. Only after understanding this can we begin to understand how the 
law operates within the exception. This is specifically the case with, as Agamben argues, 
the applicability of the law, not simply its existence. 
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1.7 Transitioning from the Exception to the Frontier 
 
 Based on what I have thus explained, we can see the complicated aspect that the 
state of exception plays in understanding and illuminating the rule of law. It reveals the 
apparent need for an exception to normal rule of law protections. Yet even though we see 
such a revelation within the exception, we are left asking what the cost of allowing such 
exceptions mean for us. Is there a compromise of sorts to be found? Is there even a need 
for a compromise? Are the exception and the norm so interrelated as to basically be 
indistinguishable? And does the rule of law’s tenuous position within the exception give 
us a better picture of its actual place within a normal, ordered society? 
The main thrust of this exploration of the state of exception, however, has been to 
illustrate the way in which the exception allows us to see a deep connection between the 
rule of law and arbitrary action or violence. We can see blurred lines between the 
exception and the norm, as well as the requirement of a force to back up the rule of law, 
to name just a couple of concepts I have discussed previously that elucidate the 
connection between violence and the law. If we accept that arbitrary action takes place in 
the exception, but is not supposed to in the norm, then a blurring of lines between the two 
makes clear that the connection between them is more explicit than it otherwise would be. 
If a force is needed to back up the rule of law, then where does that force come from? 
And even in times of so-called normalcy, what is that force? What gives the rule of law 
its legitimacy?  
 In exploring these questions, I now turn to John Ford’s The Man Who Shot 
Liberty Valance. Its placement on the frontier, coupled with its narrative of the American 
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re-founding after the civil war, allow us to look more deeply at the connection between 
the rule of law and violence. The characters, as well as the way the film opens and ends, 
reveal an aspect to the rule of law not regularly discussed within the philosophical 
literature, that of “printing the legend.” With that, I turn to the Western and The Man 
Who Shot Liberty Valance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
“LIBERTY VALANCE: ‘WESTERN’ LAW AND PRINTING THE 
LEGEND” 
 
 
 
 
 
2.0 Defining the Concept of the Western 
 
 What is the Western as a genre of film? Jim Kitses describes in great detail how 
film criticism has directly tied the genre to its landscape,80 whether it be to analogize 
America’s push westward, or to create a dichotomy between masculine and feminine. 
(Although, to be fair, the sprawling “Wild West” landscape does not come into as much 
play in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, a film that largely takes place in one town, 
and in a strange, almost artificial confinement.) As André Bazin stated in his essay on the 
Western, “Galloping horses, fights, strong and brave men in a wildly austere landscape 
could not add up to a definition of the genre nor encompass its charms.”81 In order to get 
a fuller understanding of the Western from a genre standpoint, let us look to three distinct 
authors and their interpretation and take on the American Western: Robert Pippin, Jim 
Kitses, and André Bazin. 
Bazin, the noted French film critic, did much to give the Western legitimacy as a 
filmic art, and not simply as a kind of pop media that in the early and mid-Twentieth 
century it was viewed as being. As he argues,  
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The building of the great railroads are less important 
perhaps than the establishment of justice and respect for the 
law. The relations between morality and law, which in our 
ancient civilization are just a subject for an undergraduate 
paper, were half a century ago the most vital thing 
confronting the youthful United States.82 
 
 
In his eyes, part of what makes the Western not only America’s greatest cinematic 
achievement, but a singular genre achievement of its own, separate from others, is its 
focus on the concept of the political and the conception of the United States itself.  
The central questions confronted by the Western are ones concerned with the rule 
of law, the formation of the legality of the state, and the concept of justice. The Western 
is recognizable by its “epic themes of nationhood and identity, its stress on honour and 
law, its focus on freedom and rebirth, the issues of violence and justice...”83 What we see 
is a political framework that is at once concerned with questioning and exploring, if not 
concluding on, these ideas. What does it mean to be an American? What is our past and 
where does it come from? Through what means have we established the legal order, and 
the concept of justice that now embodies our political beliefs as a nation?  
Certainly Pippin agrees that the Western is at once concerned with such grand 
ideas.84 According to Kitses, these themes are especially true in John Ford’s Westerns, 
stating that, “His main theme was the birth of America, the establishing of nationhood, 
the shining City on the Hill.”85 In speaking of My Darling Clementine86 he notes that, 
“the film proposes that the violent elimination of anarchy is the final act in a historical 
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process that initially involves the establishment and defence of law, culture and 
religion.”87 
 Even past the idea of “making America,” so to speak, we find the Western 
thought of as the American mythic tale. The Western is to America what the Greek myths 
and tragedies are to Greece. Bazin speaks to this point, saying that, “The epic and tragic 
hero is a universal character. The Civil War is part of nineteenth century history, the 
western has turned it into the Trojan War of the most modern of epics. The migration to 
the West is our Odyssey.”88 Pippin echoes this argument throughout his book.89 Kitses is 
just as clear about connecting the Western to some concept of an American myth, using 
that phrase many times throughout his chapter on the “Practice and Theory” of the 
Western.90  
What becomes clear about the Western is that it is thought of in epic terms; it is a 
purely American epic. I contend that in much the same way that the Greeks have 
Heracles, and the Romans Achilles, Americans have their “Man With No Name,” and the 
comic book superhero.91 Furthermore, the relation of the epic hero to that of the 
American superhero, and furthermore, to the heroic gunslinger of the Western is quite 
close. If we think of the epic hero, such as Achilles, we see men with superhuman 
powers; almost invincible, capable of feats beyond normal human ability, we see a direct 
correlation to the mythic gunslinger. Able to shoot targets from a great distance, and 
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outdraw opponents with an inhuman speed and accuracy, as well as the mysterious 
“otherness” associated with him. In cases such as Stagecoach (1939)92 with John 
Wayne’s Ringo Kid, as well as Sergio Leone’s “Man With No Name” movies with Clint 
Eastwood, we see the heroic gunslinger as a mysterious individual who possesses an 
“otherness,” or a dark and/or unknown past. As will become more clear later in Chapter 3, 
this same thematic quality is apparent in the comic book superhero like that of Batman. 
Along with superhuman powers - and although he has no actual powers, his skills 
certainly qualify as “superhuman” - we find the character as a mysterious outsider, 
plagued by a dark past.  
Not all Westerns can be said to embody the complexities I have discussed here. 
“One sometimes hears that the great thing about Westerns is their moral clarity: black 
hats and white hats, bad guys and good guys, and morally uplifting tales of the victory of 
good guys over bad guys,” but is this the case? Pippin does not believe so, arguing that 
“This might have been true of TV shows like Gunsmoke and 90 percent of the ‘B’ 
Westerns,” going on to say that, “it certainly is not true of the work of directors like 
Ford93… In fact, just the opposite is often true. Their Westerns are more like noirs than 
children’s adventure stories or action pictures.” I would agree with this assessment, as 
well as the following point he makes that “What is true is that their presentations of 
conflict, hesitations, ambiguity, and crises largely concern characters trying to resolve 
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issues of right, justice, responsibility, honor…”94 This is what separates the normal, or 
“B-Western” from what Pippin and others refer to as the Great Western.95 
The Great Western, then, is deeply rooted in the American past: the foundation of 
the United States as we know it today. It connects itself to the grandiose themes of 
Manifest Destiny, a push Westward from the East. As such, much of the genre takes 
place on the frontier, in what can only be considered a lawless zone where the gun rules 
and legalistic forms of justice are, if not completely nonexistent, then struggling for 
survival. 
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2.1 The Frontier as a State of Exception 
 
 This is the key feature of the Western that Robert Pippin does not engage to a 
great degree: the idea that the frontier represents what essentially amounts to a state of 
exception. I will be engaging with this idea in the following. Although Pippin discusses 
this to some degree – such as his references to “prefounding lawlessness” 96– he does not 
engage in the literature of states of exception, nor consider the deeper implications that 
the exception, in its literal and philosophical sense, has on American identity. 
Furthermore, he does not engage directly with the implications of the rule of law as a 
result of the frontier’s zone outside normalcy. The simple nature of a tenuous relationship 
between the law and violence in the frontier is only one small piece of the larger puzzle. 
It is how the people respond to that relationship – the actions they take, the consequences 
of those actions, etc. – that is most important to understanding the frontier as a state of 
exception. Although it is indeed true that in the normal understanding of the state of 
exception, it is placed in opposition to the state before the exception – one of normalcy – 
when put in the context of films like The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, the idea of the 
frontier as the exception becomes clearer. 
The frontier has been used to represent many things depending on the movie - 
though all are very connected to the idea of the American myth, through the great push 
westward - but what I find most important for the purposes of this thesis is the idea of the 
frontier as a zone outside of legality. As The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance displays 
quite adeptly, the frontier is a place that is at odds with ordered society. One of the main 
pieces of the film’s narrative concerns bringing law and order to the town of Shinbone. 
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This battle between law and anarchy, and the question of how one brings order to a 
society that inherently has none is one of the common themes of the great American 
Western. If no system is in place to control chaos, then chaos reigns, just as the outlaw 
Liberty Valance (Lee Marvin) makes clear to Ransom Stoddard (James Stewart). Yet as 
horrible and anathema to legal order as Valance may be, one would be right to question 
Tom Doniphon (John Wayne) as well. Not only does Doniphon encourage Stoddard to 
carry and use a gun to deal with outlaws like Liberty Valance, but in the end it is he who 
shoots Valance, which in turn leads to law and order in the town and by extension 
statehood.  
Even if one is to admit that because the society is lawless, such actions are not 
“above the law,” that by no means excuses the action of what is essentially cold-blooded 
murder. This is also present in John Ford’s Stagecoach (1939), again with John Wayne’s 
character, who spends the movie seeking out and waiting to shoot someone and get 
revenge for a past wrong. The message is clear: if the legal order does not exist to an 
adequate degree, then the law must be taken into one’s own hands. Where then does this 
leave the concept of the rule of law? Does the rule of law simply cease to exist, or does 
the action of Wayne’s character in both films signal that there is in fact some concept of 
the rule of law, just one that must exist when “normal legal means” have been suspended 
or are nonexistent?  
Moreover, even if one’s issues of the legality of such action are pushed to the side, 
it is more difficult to dismiss the moral implications of such actions. Even if we accept 
that the “way of the gun” is the legal order of the frontier, there are undeniably moral 
implications associated with taking action that would be considered reprehensible in a 
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state of normalcy. Furthermore, by giving in to such action, one must ask oneself whether 
it simply exacerbates the status quo of the state’s legality, or lack there of. The question 
of morality is one that complicates these matters. As Pippin states with regard to 
Stagecoach,  
 
Ford’s film is a compelling visual alternative, a picture of 
an aspiration to equality that Tocqueville did not seem to 
understand well--a claim to moral equality, the equal 
dignity and worth, the “inestimable” value of each 
individual as such, as Kant put it, following Rousseau. For 
all the inequalities in talent and accomplishment, no human 
life can be said to be worth more than any other, because 
no price or measure of value can be fixed on human 
worth.97 
 
  
Yet if every human life has an “inestimable” value, and no human life is worth more than 
any other, how can one justify the actions of Tom Doniphon in Liberty Valance? Perhaps 
if one makes the argument that the end justifies the means, then such an outlook is 
immediately defensible.  
I would argue, however, that such a point is not only short-sighted, but falls into 
the trap of pure Schmittian logic. To Schmitt, the moral implications are secondary to the 
survival of the state. Yet I question the assumption this logic makes. Does not a well-
ordered society, especially a “healthy” democracy, depend upon a moral basis to the rule 
of law? Without a moral grounding, can the rule of law exist in any reasonable fashion, or 
does it instead lead to a Schmittian system where legal rights and the rule of law only 
exist if it is convenient to the sovereign? As I will explore in more depth later, a moral 
agent of some kind, even if his actions seem to work against the rule of law, can rather 
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work to prop up the rule of law, and by extension give it a force that it did not otherwise 
have. 
 One of the key themes of Liberty Valance is the idea of creating a state of 
lawfulness, of nationhood. We have the main protagonist of the film, Ransom Stoddard, 
as attempting to bring the law to a lawless society. He wants to bring statehood to the 
frontier so that it may live under the rule of law. On the blackboard in his classroom are 
the words, “education is the basis of the rule of law.” In this small detail we see the 
message Ford is conveying, as well as the intentions of Stoddard. Education is seen here 
as a means to a specific end. To educate is not simply to give knowledge and power to 
the people, but it is a way in which the law can be established, and as a result, allow the 
rule of law to thrive. In this we see that Stoddard’s character is most concerned with the 
lack of legal order in the town of Shinbone. This is understandable, given the beatings he 
endured at the hands of Liberty Valance. 
Symbolically however, it operates as a way to draw a distinct line between a state 
of normalcy, or legality, and a state of exception, or one that lacks legal order. This 
relates directly back to Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, and the idea of political 
definition. The frontier need not have been in a state of legal order previous to its current 
lack of such in order to be analogous to the state of exception. The frontier’s definitional 
feature as being opposite the rule of law is sufficient. Furthermore, if we think of the 
frontier in Lockean terms,98 we can see that the frontier is analogous to a state of nature, 
opposite statehood’s state of order and reason.  
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 If the exception in the traditional sense is thought of as suspending the rule of law 
for the sake of eventually re-establishing the rule of law, then the frontier-aspect of the 
Western can easily adopt a slightly different understanding: rather than re-establish the 
rule of law, the frontier simply must establish the rule of law. It is important to note here 
is that the conditions of the state of exception apply themselves quite forcefully to the 
Western concept of the frontier. With these ideas in mind, let us look at The Man Who 
Shot Liberty Valance in greater depth. 
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2.2 The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance: A Political Exploration 
 
John Ford’s The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance is arguably one of the most 
important films as it relates to a discussion of the political identity of the American 
people. Although the Western as a whole is definitional as a true American cinema, and a 
concretely American art, Liberty Valance represents a culmination of the Western to the 
point it was released in 1962. The film is told mostly in flashback. The film both looks 
back at the founding of the United States and its movement West, as well as leaving open 
the country’s ambiguous future. If the Western mythologized the founding of the country, 
then Liberty Valance argues that the myth is required. It also squarely confronts the issue 
of whether violence is required to establish a rule of law and legal order.99  
As the film opens, it is “present day,” with James Stewart’s Ranse Stoddard, a 
Senator, riding into the small town of Shinbone on a train. He is there to go to the funeral 
of a man, Tom Doniphon, who is known to no one, and whose life seems meaningless to 
the townspeople. Why would a big Washington Senator travel to go to the funeral of such 
an unknown man? Journalists gather to find out why; the presence of these men, in 
contrast to what the viewer is soon shown, establishes clearly that law, order, and the 
American constitution have come to this town. We see a freedom of the press not found 
in the “past,” though such a freedom struggles and pushes to break through. By contrast, 
it is alive and well in the “present.” But the film never once strays from asking the 
question, “at what cost?” The film forces us to confront the idea that violence is a 
requirement in establishing a rule of law system. “The film’s action is not the generic 
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dramatization of the violent process by which America was civilized. Rather, it is the 
revelation of the kind of violence that was required, and its personal and political 
consequences.”100 This is the heart of my argument, and the core of Liberty Valance’s 
importance to understanding it. In the case of the foundation of a rule of law system, 
violence plays an inherent part; but the basic ideas of violence having a role, in its 
simplicity, ignores the larger implications of what that means for society. 
The film’s opening and its ending are, as I see it, the most important aspects of the 
film. It is not that what comes between these bookends is not important, but the 
implications raised in how the film begins and then how it ends, are arguably what give it 
the power and political intrigue that it is known for. Thus, I will focus on these two points 
in the film, as well as the characters that have the most relevant purpose within the film’s 
bookends. 
 When the film shifts to flashback – and it must be noted, Ranse Stoddard’s 
version of events – we see him traveling from the East to Shinbone, a town outside of the 
United States. He is a lawyer, traveling to the town of Shinbone to establish a law 
practice. However, before he gets to the town, an outlaw named Liberty Valance and his 
gang hold up the coach and demand the belongings of the travelers. Stoddard stands up to 
Valance. “What kind of men are you?” he demands. “This kind, dude,” the outlaw 
responds, slapping him to the ground and retorting, “what kind of man are you, dude?” 
The most important part of this exchange, however, comes when Stoddard mentions he is 
a lawyer and plans to see Valance in jail. Sending the coach on its way, he takes 
Stoddard’s legal books and rips them up, declaring “Lawyer, huh? Well I’ll teach you law 
– Western law.” Valance then proceeds to violently whip Stoddard.  
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The whole scene is blanketed in blacks and dark grays, a sharp contrast to the 
previous light, cold grays of the opening of the film. In fact, the contrast is a direct one 
between light and dark, as the opening takes place during the day and the flashback 
beginning in the dead of night. In the beginning then, Ford establishes that the film is not 
only a conflict between the East and West, but between the rule of law and anarchy. 
Cinematographically, the shift between cool grays and deep blacks bathes the flashback – 
the past – in a darkness no longer present.101 
 What we find is that Shinbone is a town still in the territories. It is not part of the 
United States, and as such, the law as it exists where Stoddard comes from has no value. 
Valance teaches Stoddard “Western law,” a law that abides by an overt terror, violence, 
and masculinity.102 Valance’s whip not only emasculates Stoddard, but it lowers him to 
the level of an animal. The camera cuts Stoddard out of the shot, simply lingering on 
Valance flailing his whip.103 The law has very little importance and strength. In fact, the 
town of Shinbone itself has no real legal authority to speak of outside of perhaps Tom 
Doniphon. There is a town marshal, Link Appleyard (Andy Devine), yet in one scene, 
Doniphon takes off the marshal’s hat and knocks it to the floor. Doniphon does so, we 
assume, because he knows how little power the marshal actually wields. Doniphon, even 
if he does represent some kind of rule of law mechanism, has no official authority. He is 
not a law officer, not even in a makeshift way, nor does he attempt to enact his authority 
in a legalistic manner. The gun is his law, and he makes that clear to Stoddard in his 
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continual insistence that he get one. But Stoddard relents, and refuses, until the end of the 
film. The events leading up to that end stretch across a large number of the questions and 
concerns inherently raised within the sphere of state of exception literature. That the film 
is so deeply tied to America and its founding only makes the questions it raises even 
more compelling, especially when tied to the modern world. 
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2.3 Bookends of the Political 
 
 The beginning of the film establishes a clear basis for comparison to the state of 
exception. We have a town that is devoid of proper rule of law protections. The outlaws 
run rampant, and there is not a proper police force to restrain them. By positioning 
Shinbone in opposition to the East, where statehood has brought rule of law protections – 
as well as the striking difference between Shinbone in the “present,” and in the past – 
Ford establishes a clear differentiation between a society where law and order exist, and 
one where it does not. Even though the traditional understanding of the “state of 
exception” is one in which a crisis has befallen the state, and where the rule of law is 
suspended in some way, Shinbone acts as a state of exception in its construction. In other 
words, Shinbone works as an environment of exception. 
 The ending of the film bookends the beginning: Valance, fearing that Shinbone 
will in fact vote for statehood, decides to terrorize the town in an attempt to prevent the 
people from taking the vote. He ends up killing the town’s journalist, Peabody (Edmond 
O’Brien), which sends Stoddard into a rage in which he capitulates to Doniphon’s ideal 
and takes a gun in hand to kill the outlaw. The shootout happens, and Stoddard thinks that 
he won, killing Valance and freeing the people to vote for statehood. But we later learn 
that Doniphon, hiding in a dark corner, shot Valance at the same time as Stoddard, giving 
the illusion that Stoddard, and not he, had shot Liberty Valance.104 Yet the credit is given 
to the lawyer from the East. There are a few points to be made with regard to this ending.  
First, what do we make of Stoddard’s capitulation to violence as a way to solve 
the problems Shinbone faces? Secondly, the ending seems to imply that the death of 
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Liberty Valance allowed for a transition to law and order; can we agree that this was 
Ford’s point? Thirdly, what can we make of the almost melancholic tone of the end of the 
film? Does Ford mean to say that such a transition to a state of legality comes at a high 
price? Is it simply an acceptance of what Agamben would argue is the normal state of 
being?105 
 Ransom Stoddard’s action at the end of the film is somewhat baffling at first 
thought. He starts out the movie a man obsessed with the traditional concept of the rule of 
law, declaring to Liberty Valance that he will see him in jail. In one iconic scene, he 
teaches the people of the town about the United States Constitution, the idea that “all men 
are created equal” in the Declaration of Independence, and of the concept of the rule of 
law – interestingly enough, Doniphon seems less than interested in such things. 
Stoddard’s refusal to carry a gun and to live by “Western law” is a point of constant 
contrast with Doniphon. Given the assumed nature of the character, the fact that he picks 
up a gun and resorts to an act of violence is somewhat shocking. Yet is it? If we work 
under a Hobbesian framework, then his action is simply an acceptance of the “law of 
nature.”106 But I do not believe it to be so simplistic.  
Turning to Pippin lends more nuance to the argument. “What this suggests is that 
the conditions necessary for law and political order and doubly morally problematic. First, 
there can be no law unless the lawless are eliminated, controlled, but given what the 
lawless are willing to do, this violent elimination cannot itself be just or fair, cannot play 
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by the rules.”107 The idea that Stoddard, so compelled to uphold the rule of law, could be 
driven to commit cold-blooded murder,108 an act that is antithetical to legal order and the 
rule of law, speaks largely to this very point. “Violence before there is law is unavoidably 
lawless,” Pippin states, “but if it is for the sake of law the paradox can be lessened if not 
eliminated.”109  
I am not sure I agree with Pippin’s point that the paradox can be eliminated. After 
all, does this not simply mean that the end justifies the means? I believe that this paradox 
can only be eliminated by accepting the inherent part that violence plays within the 
founding of the rule of law. To restate myself: if the transition to, or re-instating of, an 
ordered state requires a lawless act, or acts, inherently, then no stark dichotomy between 
the rule of law and violence can possibly exist. Although it is true that law and order are 
conventionally viewed as oppositional to anarchy and lawlessness – and it is true that 
Ford has taken this position by placing Stoddard in opposition to Valance, a point I will 
later elaborate upon – that does not necessarily preclude violence from being a piece of 
the transition from lawlessness to the rule of law. The paradoxical aspect comes from the 
idea that a lawless act cannot possibly be used to foster an ordered society.  
Yet although Ford clearly sees, accepts, and understands the oppositional 
framework of law and order to anarchy and lawlessness, he also seems to indicate that in 
times of crisis, when the rule of law ceases to exist in a normal form, a lawless or violent 
act may be required. Jacques Derrida, for example, argues that no liberal or parliamentary 
democracy can be founded without violence, stating that, “As means, all violence founds 
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or preserves droit.110  Otherwise it would lose all value… every juridical contract… is 
founded on violence. There is no contract that does not have violence as both an origin 
and an outcome.”111  
Ford was no stranger to this framework, having used it before in his film My 
Darling Clementine years earlier. That film, which he made soon after World War II, 
deals with the Earps (including Wyatt, as played by Henry Fonda) moving into the town 
of Tombstone, which has little law and order to speak of. When Wyatt first comes to the 
town, he remarks at how little order exists. When his brother is murdered by outlaws, he 
decides to stay and become the marshal in order to enact revenge. “Ford insists on 
paradox: in order to achieve his violent personal revenge, Earp must first become the 
law.”112 But it goes further than that. The film ends with the climatic gunfight at the O.K. 
Corral, after which Earp leaves, having rid the town of the Clanton family. As Jim Kitses 
notes, “Structurally and dramatically, the film proposes that the violent elimination of 
anarchy is the final act in a historical process that initially involves the establishment and 
defence of law, culture and religion.”113 The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance furthers this 
ideology, bringing it to an even more overt realization. But it is the characters in Liberty 
Valance that elucidate these points. 
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2.4 Stoddard, Doniphon, and Valance: Metaphors of Political Theory 
 
 Between the characters of Liberty Valance and Ransom Stoddard, we find an 
inherently oppositional nature. From the beginning of the film when Valance whips 
Ransom, the two are placed in opposition to each other; one represents the ideal of law, 
order, and morality, and the other the anarchy that exists without the rule of law. From 
the get-go, the film outlines itself in the same friend/enemy distinction raised by Schmitt. 
Even more, the two are placed in geographical opposition: East versus West. In this 
sense, we find not only a philosophical and metaphorical opposition between the two, but 
a physical one as well. They come from different worlds, abide by different rules. Yet it 
is clear that one represents the ideal of democracy and the rule of law, and the other 
anarchy and chaos. The established state of existence in Shinbone is one outside legal 
norms, at least norms as they are regarded where Stoddard comes from. In one scene, 
while he is working to pay for his upkeep, Valance trips him. No one responds, with the 
exception of Tom Doniphon. But his response seems motivated more by the fact that his 
steak was thrown to the ground than the fact that Valance is abusing Stoddard. “This 
town could use a little law and order,” a character remarks at one point. 
 Yet just as Pippin argues that Westerns like Liberty Valance are not as simplistic 
as a black/white, right/wrong dichotomy, the character of Tom Doniphon adds a third 
outlook on the state of the rule of law in Shinbone. Doniphon, unlike Stoddard and 
Valance, does not fit so nicely into the basic Schmittian dichotomy. Rather, he seems to 
exist outside, or at least to the side, of the other two. Though it is clear that he does not 
endorse Valance’s anarchic worldview, he still nonetheless endorses the idea of violence 
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as, if not a solution to the problem, then certainly a requirement of enduring it. Doniphon 
carries a gun with him, and encourages Stoddard to do the same. On that detail alone it is 
clear he capitulates to the idea of “Western law” that Valance introduces in the beginning 
of the film. In other words, although Doniphon does not prescribe to Valance’s anarchy, 
he still believes in the idea of violence as a prescription for wrongs. His presence makes 
what would otherwise be an open and shut case of right and wrong an ambiguous 
situation where right and wrong are no longer so cut and dry.  
Does he represent some aspect of the rule of law? He certainly keeps Shinbone in 
some type of legal order. He appears to be the only thing preventing Liberty Valance 
from complete sovereignty. It is clear that he has some kind of restraint. He does not 
simply rape and pillage as he sees fit. One of the factors restraining him is Doniphon. For 
example, in the same scene in which Valance trips Stoddard, Doniphon stands up against 
Valance. And Valance backs down. The question we must ask is why he backs down. 
Why is Doniphon able to keep Liberty Valance in check, so to speak? Could it be that 
they are, in some sense, two sides of the same coin?114 If we accept that Valance and 
Stoddard are in opposition to each other, where precisely does Doniphon fit in? I believe 
that Doniphon essentially represents some form of rule of law mechanism. Although he 
certainly uses methods that can only be considered extralegal, or extra-constitutional,115 
his actions at times still tend to uphold some form of order. It is possible that Doniphon 
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represents the idea that Bonnie Honig raises in such “Catch-22” situations. Although no 
option is ideal, something must be done, some action must be taken. If you carry and use 
a gun, you are taking some form of extralegal action, and yet refusing to carry one leaves 
you open to abuse from someone like Valance. The inherent problems expressed here, 
and the different approaches of these three characters outlines the inherent legal, moral, 
and political implications of a state of exception.  
David Livingstone takes a more classical approach to these three characters, 
interpreting them through the lens of “classical political philosophy,” and assigning each 
of them a piece of Socrates’ tripartite soul (reason, spiritedness, and appetite). He argues 
that, “Liberty Valance symbolizes the ‘anarchy of unruly passions,’ Tom Doniphon 
represents ‘the moral ambiguity of spiritedness,’ and Ransom Stoddard is the ‘symbol of 
reason and the rule of law.’”116 He makes his point by arguing against the idea that “the 
end of lawlessness… requires the end of heroism.”117 This point is well taken, but given 
the film’s ending, can it truly be said that the film does not in some way endorse the idea 
that violence, or violent actions, have a direct correlation to the founding of the rule of 
law? Even Livingstone concedes that this interpretation has been ascribed to the film,118 
and as I have argued, this framework is not uncommon to John Ford’s Westerns. 
Joshua Dienstag has an inspired approach to the whole film, as well as the 
paradox of legal order requiring violence.119 He too assigns the same basic metaphorical 
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positions that I do to the main characters of the film. He also assigns the concept of 
demos, or “the common people” to that of Hallie (Vera Miles). In Dienstag’s mind, “’the 
man who shot Liberty Valance’… is really both Doniphon and Stoddard, neither one of 
them sufficient to the task by themselves.”120 What he means by this boils down to the 
following: if Stoddard represents a strong legal foundation – a foundation of the rule of 
law – and Doniphon, extralegal power,121 then in order to transition to an ordered state, 
both things are needed, neither sufficient alone to establish a rule of law system. In this 
sense, Dienstag agrees with the “cynical” interpretation of the film that Livingstone 
somewhat rejects.  
The required use of force and violence is only further emphasized when Liberty 
Valance is rejected by the townspeople in a vote to send delegates from the territory to 
vote for statehood. When Shinbone holds the vote, Valance shows up – and he can hardly 
be rejected, as in a pluralistic democracy like that of the United States,122 even someone 
like Valance is thought to deserve a voice – and subsequently attempts to threaten the 
townspeople into voting for him as a delegate. He fails, however, when the people reject 
his intimidation. It is here that Valance does follow through on his threats, wreaking more 
havoc upon the town and killing Peabody, Shinbone’s sole newspaperman. “At this point, 
neither man sees an alternative… For either Ransom or Tom to kill Valance would 
violate his principles (for Ransom, the principle of acting through law; for Tom, the 
principle to only act in self-defense); but without the death of Liberty, the project of 
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sovereign law will fail” (emphasis added).123 This directly confronts the view that the 
rule of law and violence are opposed to one another. If we take Dienstag’s argument at 
face value – and there is little reason not to – then the two cannot be opposed. In fact, 
they are intrinsically connected. 
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2.5 Print The Legend 
 
My final point on The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance concerns the idea of 
“printing the legend.” In the film, the audience begins by believing that Ransom Stoddard 
was the man who shot Liberty Valance. It is not until later that we find out that he did not, 
in fact, shoot Valance. Yet he is still thought of as the man who did. He still reaps the 
benefits, so to speak. He is known for having brought statehood to the territory, partially 
through this morally questionable and arguably extralegal measure. There are two 
questions that must be asked, knowing the facts of the story. First, what was the cost of 
bringing the rule of law to the territory through such means? Secondly, what does this 
concept of “printing the legend” mean for the polity of the United States? 
 It is difficult, if not impossible, I believe, to fully answer the first question. There 
are myriad answers. Maybe the right way of framing the question is not “what is the cost,” 
but “is there a cost?” For we certainly know that law and order came to Shinbone after 
the death of Liberty Valance, and it is difficult to imagine this taking place if not for 
Valance’s death. In this most basic sense, his death must have been a positive, correct? 
Then why is there such a sense of melancholy in the air, in the expressions of both 
Stoddard and Hallie in the beginning and end of the film? Why is the film bathed in cold 
greys? “The generally depressed atmosphere echoes a setting bereft of charm or 
dynamism,” notes Jim Kitses, going on to say “The last major Western of its era to be 
made in black and white, Liberty Valance creates a modern-day America as a grey, 
colourless world…”124 Cinematically, we must accept that Ford does not intend us to 
look positively upon the way in which the rule of law came to Shinbone (and in the larger 
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symbolic sense, the United States as a whole). Yet he also seems to accept that something 
had to be done.  
The sense I gather is that such action cannot be repudiated as wrong, for it was 
necessary, and yet at the same time, we must accept that something is amiss with the idea 
that liberalism and democracy exist because violence has allowed them to. The rule of 
law is only a stable piece of said democracy because it was initially violated. I believe 
that Ford uses such an aesthetic to get at the heart of the personal, moral cost for Stoddard 
himself. He is the only one that knows the truth of what happened (and perhaps Hallie, a 
subject for another thesis), and must live with that burden. But it is true that men like 
Liberty Valance no longer terrorize the area, and that – with the arrival of a train in the 
beginning versus a horse and carriage – modernity and a civilized order are flourishing. 
Stoddard is the man upon whose shoulders the burdens of action that must be taken have 
to rest. He is the “moral agent” of whom Bonnie Honig speaks.125 But there is also a 
sense that the coldness of the “present day” scenes comes from a cynicism within 
Ransom Stoddard that did not exist in the past. After all, he enters Shinbone expecting to 
set up a law practice, establish the rule of law through purely democratic and legal means, 
but ends up at least partially throwing out his values on the subject for the sake of “the 
greater good.” 
 Has there been a cost, though? If violence is required to establish a rule of law 
system, has the establishment of that system actually changed anything? Or is it the case 
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inaction is action, someone has to take the moral burden off the polity. Someone has to take responsibility 
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office and power but has to live with the permanent consciousness of being an actor, as heavy a burden, in 
its own way.” 
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that, in establishing a “state of normalcy,” so to speak, we have simply put a mask over a 
state that is essentially unchanged, at least in the core merits of its institution? Is the 
modernity of the “present time” in Liberty Valance just a façade that we as a polity must 
afford ourselves in order to live with the consequences of the sacrifices it took to create 
an ordered state? Liberty Valance may be dead, but does that fundamentally change 
anything, or does it simply allow us to shield ourselves from the realities of living in a 
modern society? The answer may lie within the most famous line of the film: “print the 
legend.” 
 According to Dienstag, this line “represents… the complicated interrelation of 
law and violence in the formation of any state.”126 This is indeed true. At almost the tail 
end of the film, after Stoddard has told the journalist interviewing him the truth of Liberty 
Valance’s shooting, the journalist takes his notes and rips them up. “You’re not going to 
print the story, Mr. Scott?” Stoddard asks. The journalist replies, “This is the West, sir. 
When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.” There are a number of possibilities to 
interpreting this line, but I believe that the most important point to be made is one of the 
myth of the American founding.  
How can we live with ourselves as a polity, knowing the true violence it took to 
create what we come to consider a legal order? Knowing that we must abandon our 
principles in order to create a principled society, how can we continue? “Both fact and 
legend, the narrative of The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance creates us as the inheritors of 
a violent past that we can choose to acknowledge or, like the editor, choose to ignore.”127 
Although Joshua Dienstag believes that we, as a collective people, “can bear to live with 
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its memory if we come to believe that its origin was not selfish but shared and 
burdensome to those who perpetrated it,” it is here that I take a different approach, one 
that Pippin endorses. He argues that “everybody can think that Ransom Stoddard killed 
Valance and so can distinguish this act of violence from a personal one by associating it 
with Ranse’s ideals, can believe that the rule of law and democracy triumphed.”128 
Printing the legend, as it were, and passing it off as fact, relieves the burden of reality 
from the shoulders of we, the people. The sacrifices of one individual, Ransom Stoddard, 
allow us to view not the betrayal of the rule of law to achieve a legal order, but rather the 
triumph of democracy in the face of adversity. 
 This is, perhaps, a cynical outlook. But I do not think it is an unfair one. From the 
beginning of America’s founding, the idea of a nation founded on “we, the people” has 
never been entirely accurate. For what do we find when we look at institutions like the 
Electoral College and the Senate? They are oligarchical, not democratic, institutions. And 
yet we are not taught growing up that our country was not founded as a nation of true 
democracy and equality. We are taught the legend. Because the legend is easier to 
stomach, is easier to digest. It is easier to believe that we need not sacrifice our values to 
achieve something great. And yet what, we must rightly ask, has changed? Was the 
transition to a normal state, with normal rule of law protections, as great as we might 
think it is? If we have truly moved forward, then it is difficult to imagine in this day and 
age, in the Twenty-first century, that the concept of sacrificing our principles to restore or 
preserve legality need exist. And yet that is exactly what we see. 
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2.6 From the Frontier to the City 
 
 The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance is a brilliant exploration of the themes of the 
rule of law, as well as how the rule of law operates in a place in which its relationship to 
violence is more overt and apparent than it normally appears to be. Although the rule of 
law seems to exist to some degree within the frontier, it does not have a force behind it 
that allows it to operate as it does in the East. But as I have demonstrated, it is not as 
though the rule of law simply ceases to exist. Through Ransom Stoddard, working to 
establish an ideal and classical rule of law system, coupled with the extralegal force of 
Tom Doniphon, it was possible to transition to an apparent normalcy. 
Liberty Valance looks at the rule of law through what is, for all intents and 
purposes, a state of exception. Working through this framework, we can see that violent 
acts are not only a part of the exception, but also a requirement to transition to the “norm.” 
The relationship between violence and the rule of law is not one of paradox, but one of 
intimate connection. 
But as I have explained, it is a hard case. It is not a strict state of exception 
situation. By contrast, The Dark Knight is. In much the same way that Liberty Valance 
uses characters to metaphorically examine rule of law mechanisms, so too does The Dark 
Knight. They are in this way very thematically similar, and as such, The Dark Knight 
provides a logical extension to that of Liberty Valance. But it also extends upon Liberty 
Valance with its post-9/11 lens. 
 As I will show in Chapter 3, The Dark Knight is a timely film, as it looks at many 
of the themes I have so far investigated with regard to Liberty Valance, but through the 
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context of a post-9/11 world. The comparisons it has drawn to George W. Bush’s 
Presidential Administration are troubling, but as such require study. Furthermore, it 
comes to a similar conclusion and understanding as that of Liberty Valance, lending more 
force to the idea that “printing the legend” is, in fact, the way in which we can reconcile 
violence with the rule of law. Let us now look at Christopher Nolan’s The Dark Knight. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“THE DARK KNIGHT: A FILMIC ANALYSIS THROUGH A POST-
9/11 LENS” 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0 Moving into Gotham 
 
 The Dark Knight draws close thematic connection to The Man Who Shot Liberty 
Valance in its treatment of the rule of law, as well as in its character and their place in the 
scope of the connection it plays to violence. Furthermore, it explores the complex 
dynamics at work concerning the morality of extralegal action within a state of exception. 
As we will see, the conclusions it makes with regard to these things bears a striking 
resemblance to those of Liberty Valance. 
What differentiates the world of The Dark Knight from a movie like The Man 
Who Shot Liberty Valance and other great Westerns, is that in The Dark Knight there is 
supposed to be a legal order in place. The film takes place in the fictional city of Gotham, 
which is obviously not a frontier outside the legal bounds of the United States; in fact, it 
is arguably the opposite. A legal system is already exists. There is the city mayor, the 
police department, and the District Attorney’s office. The key point is that the normal 
mechanisms are ineffectual. It could be that they lack a force to back them up. Yet we see 
that corruption has run so rampant that even Commissioner Gordon’s (Gary Oldman) 
right-hand officer betrays him to the mob. In The Dark Knight’s predecessor, Batman 
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Begins,129 it is established that Bruce Wayne (Christian Bale) chooses to don the cape and 
cowl because of the extensive crime in the city. In The Dark Knight, we see the 
continuation of Batman’s “quest” so to speak, to rid the city of crime. Batman’s tactics 
have been working, and have squeezed the mob into a corner, with different factions 
working together, rather than vying for power, in order to survive. Yet despite an 
improvement in the crime levels in the city, we still see that they are above and beyond 
the normal capabilities of the police force and the executive through District Attorney 
Harvey Dent (Aaron Eckhart).  
We further see how crime ridden the city is through the opening scene, which is a 
bank heist. This clearly establishes crime as the forefront of the film’s thematic 
justification for Batman’s existence. Without crime at the high level that is it, and without 
corruption infecting the government, Batman ceases to have a purpose. In a similar way 
that the lack of a normal legal system and widespread crime leave the frontier in a state of 
rule-of-law-flux, so too is Gotham City. The introduction of The Joker (Heath Ledger) 
only exacerbates the amount to which the rule of law’s place within the city has been 
complicated. He embodies (as did Liberty Valance) the very essence of the destruction of 
the rule of law. He represents anarchy and chaos. As Bruce Wayne’s faithful butler 
Alfred (Michael Caine) says at one point, “some men just want to watch the world burn.” 
The Joker’s motives are as inconsistent and confounding as the explanations he gives of 
the scars on his face.130 The Joker, as the embodiment of lawlessness, presents a stark 
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image of a force that demands a response. Through him and the terror he inflicts upon the 
city, as well as the other criminal factions existent within Gotham, we can connect the 
film not only to contemporary explorations of the rule of law in the modern world, but of 
the state of exception as well. 
Through this state of exception framework, we can see the operation of the rule of 
law, just as was the case in Liberty Valance. What mechanisms are available when the 
law ceases to carry weight? What solutions, if any, exist when the refuge of the rule of 
law is no longer fully available? I will confront these and other questions in this chapter, 
and given the importance of establishing the state of exception’s place within the film, I 
now turn to that idea. 
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3.1 Gotham City as the Exception 
 
It is easy to see how the state of exception exists within the film. Batman exists as 
a response to what he considers extraordinary circumstances; the crime levels in Gotham 
City have reached unmanageable levels. Not only is the mob a major player in Gotham 
City’s crime, but petty criminals, drug lords, and then terrorists, inhabit it. What is not 
precisely clear is whether Bruce Wayne (Christian Bale), in taking up the role of his alter 
ego, is making this judgment, or if the city has long ago made this judgment itself. 
Certainly, we are given a clear indication that the legal frameworks within Gotham have 
been struggling to survive; the criminal syndicates had previously been in control, and 
law enforcement’s effectiveness was, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent. In other 
words, “In the absence of effective law enforcement, the criminals in the Gotham 
Underground have taken control of the city, leaving a volatile and chaotic atmosphere in 
their wake.”131 In one scene, Assistant District Attorney Rachel Dawes (Maggie 
Gyllenhaal) asks, “How could you want to raise children in a city like this?” Although 
she is not specifically implicating the unnaturally high crime rates, in responding, Harvey 
Dent takes it to mean as much, leading the viewer to perceive Gotham as a city that has 
been thrust into a state of crisis. 
The Bat signal personifies this. Its existence furthers the acceptance by both 
Gordon and Dent that Batman is at times needed. The use of the signal essentially calls 
for a moment of exception, as is done when it is used to ask Batman to go to Hong Kong 
and apprehend Lau (Chin Han), a crime lord who has fled the United States. The Bat 
signal operates as an indication that an exceptional circumstance exists, and as a result, 
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exceptional action should be taken. Without an environment of emergency, such a signal 
would have no use. In other words, “the meaning conveyed by the bat signal is an 
acknowledgement that the present crisis is perceived as beyond the scope of traditional 
law enforcement…”132 The signal is not simply a calling card for Gordon, however, 
although he is the only one who uses it. Gordon is the only cop Batman believes is not 
dirty and so is the only cop he trusts and agrees to work with. But there is a collective 
acquiescence of the signal’s use and its symbolic meaning. This is why, in one of the 
final shots of the film, the destruction of the Bat signal holds such power.133 The rule of 
law has failed, and so Batman must take the place of what the state has failed to do: 
protect its citizens and enforce the law as it should traditionally be enforced, even if that 
enforcement is not done in the traditional, legalistic sense. 
The introduction of the Joker only exacerbates the concept of crisis, and by 
extension, the rule of law’s overall weakness. This is especially true as the film 
progresses, from the opening scene of a simple bank robbery to eventually blowing up a 
hospital, to the threat of blowing up boats with living people on them, the Joker’s acts of 
terror continue to escalate. Even when compared to Gotham’s normally overwhelming 
crime, the Joker’s terrorism is framed as demanding special action. The city’s police 
force is unable to adequately deal with his acts of terror on their own, and so resort to 
allowing mechanisms that under normal conditions would easily violate the rule of law. 
The film makes quite clear that Batman exists out of some sort of necessity; this point is 
strongly emphasized when Bruce Wayne attempts to give up his alter ego and is, for all 
intents and purposes, forced to take it up again. In this way, the film sets itself up not 
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simply as an analogy for post-9/11 politics, but as a discussion of the response to a state 
of crisis in general. 
 Even if we accept that the city has entered a state of exception, and even if we 
accept that the normal legal channels have essentially failed, are Batman’s actions 
legitimate? Where does Batman’s legitimacy come from, and does that legitimacy give us 
insight into the rule of law’s relation to violence? If Batman, who uses overt violence134 
“for the greater good,” can be deemed a legitimate mechanism, then does this validate the 
reasoning that the rule of law requires some form of violent action? Let us take one of the 
biggest examples used by conservatives supporting the film: Batman uses the cell phones 
of the citizens of Gotham to spy on them and pinpoint The Joker’s location,135 uses 
violence – arguably torture – to gain vital information, and frequently sidesteps standard 
legal authority to apprehend criminals. This places the film clearly within the realm of 
concepts related to the rule of law and its uses and abuses. The film’s grounding within a 
state of exception framework further allows us to look at these questions through the lens 
of not simply a transition from a “state of nature” to a state of order, but as a state of 
order thrust into exceptional circumstances. Before I examine The Dark Knight itself, 
however, let us look at the similarities we find between it and The Man Who Shot Liberty 
Valance. The thematic connections the two films bear place them on similar interpretive 
ground. 
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3.2 The Dark Knight as a Western? 
 
 Although I am not suggesting that The Dark Knight is actually a Western, the 
thematic similarities that it has to both the genre, and to Liberty Valance place it clearly 
within the same thread of thinking that I have been pursuing thus far. I have previously 
spoken of the concept of the epic, or mythological hero. Robert Pippin argues, “Many 
Westerns revolve around a pair of characters who seem to figure as two sides of the 
heroic character, or of any heroic character: a violent, extralegal, ‘elemental’ side, and a 
domesticated, law-abiding side.”  He references Doc Holliday and Wyatt Earp in My 
Darling Clementine, as well as Tom Doniphon and Ransom Stoddard in The Man Who 
Shot Liberty Valance. This same dynamic is used in The Dark Knight, in a much more 
explicit way with Batman and Harvey Dent. In this sense, we can see a direct thematic 
relationship of The Dark Knight to the Western as I have so far established. 
What is interesting is the way in which each uses their respective characters. In 
My Darling Clementine, Wyatt Earp comes into the town of Tombstone and takes the job 
of marshal. Throughout the film, his sense of justice, law and order are at odds with Doc 
Holliday, who uses intimidation and threats to get what he wants. More than once he 
encourages Earp, who doesn’t carry a gun, to do so because of the threat of violence in 
the town. In The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, the earnest, law-abiding lawyer from 
the east, Ransom Stoddard, is consistently at odds with the gun-toting Tom Doniphon. In 
both instances, one character represents the face of law and order, or the rule of law as is 
normally understood, and another an “extralegal” side. In this we can see the 
metaphorical battle of the state of exception’s rule of law played out through the 
  
 
81
characters; that is, the apparent need for extralegal measures while attempting to maintain 
the rule of law. 
The Dark Knight, by extension, has the vigilante Batman, who uses violence, 
coercion, and a number of other “extralegal” measures to apprehend criminals. Alongside 
him is Harvey Dent, the District Attorney who uses the law, and depends on the rule of 
and by law, to both try and convict those criminals. The Dark Knight makes this 
thematically explicit with reference to Batman as Dark Knight vs. Dent as Gotham’s 
White Knight. It further reflects this duality, as well as the difficult questions of the 
legality of one’s actions when Dent transforms into the villain Two-Face, half of his face 
burned beyond recognition.136 Not only is the duality expressed in the physical, as well as 
psychological, separation of Dent, we see another side to the law-abiding citizen of the 
once-proud District Attorney. 
 The conflict between legal and extralegal becomes crystal clear through Dent’s 
manifestation of Two-Face. And it further forces us to question what the best course of 
action is. In the films mentioned in this thesis, it is violence that eventually leads to a 
resolution of sorts. None of them, whether they condone the violence that is used, resolve 
whether that violence was required to get to that point of resolution. Yet they leave one 
with the impression, or the idea, that violence is a necessary part of resolving conflict, or 
instilling legal order in a society without it. 
I believe that the most important tenets of the Western are those of discussions 
and dissections of the law (and the rule of law), justice, and morality. Moreover, just as 
John Ford’s Westerns, like The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance and My Darling 
Clementine are so deeply focused on the construction and myth of American identity, The 
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Dark Knight is as well. “The great Hollywood Westerns present in a recognizably mythic 
form dimensions of an American self-understanding of great relevance to the question of 
the nature of the political in the American imaginary.”137 The main differences lie in the 
temporal. While Ford’s Westerns are concerned with the reconstruction of the United 
States following the Civil War, as well as being made during and mostly after World War 
II. The Dark Knight, by contrast, was filmed and released after 9/11, and at the close of 
George W. Bush’s second term as President. In some ways, this returns us to the concepts 
of the Western that I have spoken of previously in Chapter 2. 
If we think of the Western as a way to understand ourselves as a polity per Pippin, 
and what it means to be an American, then The Dark Knight can be thought of as a 
reevaluation of that meaning in the light of 9/11. Its main focus is clearly within the 
realm of post-9/11 politics, and as such, this is the lens through which we must regard it. 
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3.3 The Dark Knight as a Post-9/11 Film 
 
 I have spoken some of the correlation in characters between The Dark Knight and 
The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance. If we think of Dent and Batman as correlating to 
Stoddard and Doniphon, respectively, then we can also think of Liberty Valance himself 
and the Joker as having a correlation. Just as Dent and Stoddard represents the rule of law 
as it ideally should be, and Doniphon and Batman represent the extralegal basis upon 
which a society must depend, or must at least accept, Liberty Valance and the Joker 
represent the anarchy and lawlessness that inherently exists within a state of emergency. 
The difference, perhaps, lies in two main points: firstly, Valance is not without his 
personal motivations. After all, he was hired to prevent statehood from coming to 
Shinbone. That can be pushed to the side as a matter of convenience in discussions of his 
place within the state of exception, but the same cannot be said for the Joker.  
The Joker, by contrast, has no clear, or even discernable motivation.138 This 
brings me to my main point here: the film squarely places the Joker within the conceptual 
framework of a post-9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist.139 Many iconographic images of the War on 
Terror are visible in the movie.140 One instance in particular rings frighteningly true. In 
once scene, the Joker kidnaps a man posing as Batman, the video leaking to the news and 
broadcast for all to see. The man is tied to a chair, and the obvious implication is that he 
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has been tortured and will most likely be killed.141 The allusion is clear: the evocation of 
images from the early 2000s, like the videos of Daniel Pearl in 2002 and Nick Berg in 
2004.142 This iconography of fear, terror and violence can further be seen in not only the 
threat, but the execution of a plot by the Joker to blow up a hospital. In most contexts, 
this simple explosion could be seen as just special effects to please a crowd – and it 
certainly functions in this way as well – but here it operates to evoke feelings we 
associate with the modern era’s War on Terror. 
This image of the Joker as an “other,” or a terrorist in the post-9/11 sense is only 
furthered when put in terms of Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, coupled with George 
W. Bush’s own words. “They believe things,” Bush said at a 2006 Republican fundraiser, 
“The best way to describe their ideology is to relate to you the fact that they think the 
opposite of the way we think.”143 This is a strict contrast of “terrorists” to “Americans.” 
In the same sense, the Joker is portrayed as the opposite of the way the audience would 
think: he is a confusing, utterly unrelatable force of evil. He is also placed in opposition 
to the characters the audience associates with fighting for freedom and justice: Batman, 
Dent, and Gordon. 
 More than images and iconography of the War on Terror, the film’s star, Christian 
Bale, has openly admitted its connection to current events, stating that “This apparently 
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lightweight superhero--originally this spoofy, kitschy, campy character--we've actually 
managed to turn that around. [The analogy of the war on terror] is absolutely one that I 
read into the script immediately.”144 What we are able to then find is that The Dark 
Knight is not only applicable to concepts of the state of exception, but also to modern 
politics. This makes the film timely in its thematic associations and compelling in its 
execution thereof. Additionally, and as a result of the film’s examination of a state of 
exception situation, the rule of law’s place in modern politics is also brilliantly explored, 
as I will more deeply analyze later in this chapter.  
Because of the film’s connection to current, post-9/11 politics, it has been widely 
seen as analogous to policies and practices of George W. Bush’s Presidential 
Administration up to that point. In the following section, I will explore these arguments 
and how they fail to fully grapple with the more nuanced ideas The Dark Knight explores, 
even if it does bear comparison to such anti-terror policies. 
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3.4 The Dark Knight and the Bush Administration: Defense or Admonition? 
 
 Given The Dark Knight’s clear association with post-9/11 politics, one idea that 
continues to be debated is that the film is a “defense of” George W. Bush’s Presidential 
Administration and the policies he used that subordinated the rule of law.145 In the 
following I will examine this argument, how it relates to the state of exception and the 
rule of law, and then finally give my own views on the subject. 
Writing for The Wall Street Journal, Andrew Klavan likened The Dark Knight to 
an analysis of, and endorsement of, George W. Bush’s policies in the war on terror. In an 
article by Klavan entitled, “What Bush and Batman Have in Common,” he states that, 
 
There seems to me no question that the Batman film "The 
Dark Knight," currently breaking every box office record in 
history, is at some level a paean of praise to the fortitude 
and moral courage that has been shown by George W. Bush 
in this time of terror and war. Like W, Batman is vilified 
and despised for confronting terrorists in the only terms 
they understand. Like W, Batman sometimes has to push 
the boundaries of civil rights to deal with an emergency, 
certain that he will re-establish those boundaries when the 
emergency is past.146 
 
 
Klavan is far from the only conservative commentator to link the film directly to post-
9/11 policies, as well as directly linking Batman’s character to George W. Bush and Dick 
Cheney. Spencer Ackerman took a similar outlook to that of Klavan,147 essentially 
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arguing that the film defends the Bush Administration’s anti-terror policies. Notable 
bloggers like Matt Yglesias agree with the assessment of comparing the film to current 
War on Terror policies.148  
However, not all of those who have looked at the film take such a strictly 
conservative view of the film. For example, Cosmo Landesman, writing for The Sunday 
Times, said that, 
 
The film champions the antiwar coalition’s claim that, in 
having a war on terror, you create the conditions for more 
terror. We are shown that innocent people died because of 
Batman - and he falls for it. Here is a Batman consumed 
with liberal guilt and self-loathing.149 
 
 
In this way we can see that the film has spurred debate across the political spectrum. Its 
overall meaning is thus up to interpretation, and not so cut and dry. The Dark Knight fits 
more into the “Great Western” model described in Chapter 2 than the “black and white 
‘B’ Westerns.” As such, and per my argument of the film’s thematic similarities to the 
Western 
To call Batman either a metaphorical defense of post-9/11 anti-terror policies, or 
one of the “antiwar coalition” I believe misses the point. If anything, these two competing 
theories raise the idea that the film, and the character of Batman himself, are more 
complex and not simply as black-and-white as one can so easily interpret them to be. As 
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Matthew Yglesias wrote, “Instead, it makes everybody think about the present political 
situation but we'll probably reach different conclusions about it just as we reach different 
conclusions about the real world.”150 This is the better approach. Rather than simply 
laying blame, or claiming acceptance, the film can be used to help us understand the 
themes it raises, especially in the context of the modern world. 
Todd McGowan, in analyzing the film, argues that Christopher Nolan does not, as 
some conservative commentators have done, endorse the comparison of Batman to 
President Bush as a positive with regard to his anti-terror policies. He argues that Batman, 
unlike for example, George W. Bush, embraces the fact that by acting outside the rule of 
law, as a vigilante, he is a criminal. In responding directly to Andrew Klavan, McGowan 
concedes that it is easy to see Batman through the sphere of conservative political 
attitudes today. He states that Batman’s actions place him “fully on the terrain of 
contemporary politics and in the company of conservative political figures.”151 But 
McGowan does not accept this argument, and rather reads the character with more depth, 
nuance, and complexity. In comparing Batman to George W. Bush and Batman’s 
extralegal measures to those of Bush’s, he states that, 
 
Both figures view it as temporary, but what separates 
Batman is the attitude he takes toward this violation of the 
law: he accepts that his willingness to embrace this type of 
exceptionality constitutes him as a criminal. Because he 
views it as a criminal act, Batman is quick to eliminate it. 
But this is precisely what Bush would be loath to accept 
and why he views the War on Terror as a quasi-eternal 
struggle.152 
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Although some might disagree with this interpretation,153 I believe it to be a more subtly 
designed and multi-layered one than the conventional argument that Batman is somehow 
analogous to George W. Bush and/or Dick Cheney.154 This is not to say that the base 
justification both use is not along the same lines – i.e. use whatever means necessary in 
order to preserve order and keep the people safe – because it is. But there are certain 
issues that prevent the analogy from holding up under heavier scrutiny. 
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 Nickie D. Phillips writes that Glenn Beck once noted George W. Bush having told him in a private 
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3.5 Batman’s Role: A Clear Distinction 
 
 It is important to remember that Batman is an unelected vigilante, not an elected 
leader of a democratic nation. This may seem like splitting hairs when speaking 
metaphorically, but the point must be taken seriously, especially if we consider Bonnie 
Honig’s argument of the people as sovereign seriously.155 Bush was not elected by the 
people to ignore the rule of law, but to follow it. Batman, by contrast, was never elected, 
but his legitimation comes through a post-hoc framework.156 If we agree that a post-hoc 
legitimation is central to the idea of the people as sovereign, then we must ask whether 
the tactics used by George W. Bush have been legitimized by the people or not, and 
would seriously question whether they in fact have been. 
Secondly, even though McGowan dismisses it,157 one cannot help but look at the 
fact that when Batman spied on the people of Gotham to find the Joker, not only did he 
put a fail-safe in place to dismantle the program immediately after its use, but further left 
that responsibility in the hands of another, Lucius Fox (Morgan Freeman).158 This point 
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 As she states, “I have focused analogously on a remainder of sovereign power (contra Schmitt and yet 
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resonates not simply because it echoes Harvey Dent’s earlier reference to the Roman 
Commissarial Dictatorship,159 but because it is an almost blatant example of such. Under 
the Roman model, “the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be 
in the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator.”160 In this circumstance, 
we can see Batman’s self-regulation, appointing someone to check his own power, to 
limit his control and the scope of his authority. 
If we look at Batman’s use of wiretapping to spy on Gotham’s citizens on its face, 
analogizing it to Bush’s tactics are clear. And yet Batman not only puts in place a stopgap, 
but puts the power to use and operate the machine in another’s hands as well. He still 
holds the responsibility of having enabled the device in the first place, but it must be 
noted that he removes himself from the question of whether it should continue. 
Furthermore, he puts that choice in the hands of someone who, by all accounts, does not 
agree with his use of the machine and openly condemns him for having even built it. 
George W. Bush, by contrast, would likely have simply continued his warrantless 
wiretapping program indefinitely, had it not come to light that such a program was, in 
fact, in use. It also must further be noted that his use of such a program was ridiculous on 
its face, as the FISA court161 had never once denied a warrant since its inception.162  
This brings us back to the distinction McGowan makes. His argument is that 
Batman, unlike George W. Bush, knowingly and overtly acts as a criminal, including 
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accepting this fact at the end of the film.163 What we see with George W. Bush, though, is 
essentially using “legal” means to undermine the rule of law.164 This is inherently 
antithetical to Batman’s approach, as he openly uses extralegal means. He does not hide 
behind a façade of legality, even if in the end one argues that his actions are justified 
given the circumstances. This subtle distinction creates a disconnect between the words 
of President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, and Batman, and their actions. I further 
believe that, when analyzed on a deeper and more nuanced level, the role that Batman 
plays is more akin to what we see from a character like Tom Doniphon in The Man Who 
Shot Liberty Valance than that of a real-world President like George W. Bush. 
 There are further implications on the rule of law to consider because of this. 
Despite the comparison of Batman to President Bush being laughable under stricter 
scrutiny, that does not mean that the vigilante gets off free. In fact, it is arguable that 
because Batman is not technically elected by the people, he has less authority to disrupt 
the normal rule of law mechanisms in place. Yet regardless of this line of thinking, what 
we must consider is whether Batman has legitimacy, where that legitimacy comes from, 
and whether his actions, extralegal or not, work to promote and strengthen the rule of law, 
or in fact – as in the case of President Bush – work to undermine it. 
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3.6 Batman: Agent of the Rule of Law, or Lawless Vigilante? 
 
It is clear that Batman’s existence is in response to a state of crisis, and that he can 
be thought of as a tool of the exception, which leads one to ask, what role does he play? 
Is he an agent of the rule of law, or just a lawless vigilante? Bruce Wayne decides to 
become Batman as a direct response to crime rates in Gotham, spurred by the death of his 
parents at the hands of a criminal. It is also clear that he uses extralegal measures in order 
to accomplish his ends, including a scene in which he essentially tortures the Joker to 
extract information, ignores the national sovereignty and extradition treaties with Hong 
Kong in order to retrieve a criminal, and wiretaps the population of Gotham without a 
warrant. Yet the people cheer for him, and it is difficult not to infer that audiences that 
watch the film in some way accept his actions in the interest of the ends he achieves;165 
mainly, that he is able to successfully stop a reign of crime and terror within the city. 
Bonnie Honig’s view is one of the most enlightening to look at with regard to 
Batman’s existence and its possible justification. She argues that politics is emergent, and 
that the rule of law is only that which the people make it. The people are the sovereign, 
and their will constitutes themselves as a polity. As she states, 
 
In a paradoxical moment of founding, however, no member 
of the community can yet be said to possess the needed 
perspective, which can only come post hoc, to form the 
rules or identify or advocate for a collective good by which 
the people need to have already been acculturated in order 
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to be not a “blind multitude” but a “people” capable of the 
autonomous exercise of popular sovereignty.166 
 
 
If we look at Batman through this Honigian lens, we see that his existence is as a result of 
the autonomous exercise of a people. In a conversation in one scene, Bruce Wayne asks, 
“Who appointed the Batman?” Dent’s response is, “We did. All of us who stood by and 
let scum take control of our city.” What we see here is an argument that Batman exists 
because the people asked for him; they may not have chosen him in the traditional 
electoral sense, but as Honig points out, post hoc legitimation is what matters.  
A polity decides on its political sphere. This is why Honig would agree with the 
legitimation of Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus. After the act took place, 
its legitimacy came through the people. True, Congress and the Courts also legitimized 
his actions, but one must remember that other actions of the like, such as the infamous 
case of Korematsu, were legitimized through legislative and judicial means, and yet have 
still been rejected by the people. In this sense, we can see Batman as an acceptable part of 
the polity, and his actions deemed lawful by the people in a post-hoc sense. If we accept 
Honig’s interpretation of the people as the sovereign, and further Carl Schmitt’s assertion 
that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception,”167 the people have decided that in 
the case of Batman, an exception is justified. 
Where does this all leave the rule of law? Honig’s argument, while giving a 
justification for Batman and his actions, does not give an answer as to how the rule of law 
gains a force or stays legitimate in light of the fact that his actions can be so easily 
interpreted as antithetical to it. But if, as I have been arguing, there is an intrinsic 
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connection between the rule of law and violence, and that violent or arbitrary action is in 
fact needed to give a force to the rule of law, then Honig’s argument as applied to The 
Dark Knight gains a force of its own. The comparison to Liberty Valance is once again 
relevant in this case, as we see the same idea of “supplement” that I spoke of in Chapter 2. 
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3.7 Batman and Dent: Supplements of the Rule of Law 
 
 In relating The Dark Knight to The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance to find some 
common thread in their portrayal of the rule of law, it is important to note the idea of 
supplement. In Chapter 2, I argued along the same lines as Joshua Dienstag, that in the 
end Ranse Stoddard needs Tom Doniphon and vice-versa, in order to produce a proper 
rule of law system. The force of Doniphon and the legal foundation of Stoddard work to 
create a system of order in a frontier that before, discernably had none. This is paralleled 
in The Dark Knight with Harvey Dent and Batman. One acts as a true agent of the rule of 
law as it is traditionally thought (Dent), and the other as an agent of justice outside of the 
normal constraints of the law (Batman). 
 Neither one of them can successfully save the city from the crime that has 
overtaken it. It is only together that they are able to produce results and prevent the city 
from falling into complete and utter chaos. In Liberty Valance, Doniphon and Stoddard 
were, as Dienstag argues, unable to produce effective results working alone.168 It was 
only when they worked – in one form or another – in conjunction that they were able to 
produce the results necessary to transition to an ordered state. In The Dark Knight, there 
is no need to transition from a state of legal flux to an ordered one, but rather to recover 
from the legal quagmire that the emergency has forced upon the city. Yet the same 
principle is still applicable. 
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Take, for example, the point in the film in which Lau flees the United States. The 
police know he is harboring criminals, and funneling money to mobsters, but can do 
nothing to stop him. Batman, having no jurisdiction,169 as he works outside the confines 
of the law, retrieves him from Hong Kong. But even though Batman has retrieved him, 
justice cannot be served, and the rule of law cannot be thought to be effective without the 
actions of Dent, the District Attorney, who must prosecute and imprison Lau under the 
normal guidelines of the law in Gotham City. This is further shown when, in one scene, 
Dent attempts to use tactics reminiscent of Batman. 
He finds one of the Joker’s thugs and puts a gun to his head, threatening to kill 
him if the man does not give him information. But the Batman intervenes, telling him, 
“you’re the symbol of hope I could never be. Your stand against organized crime is the 
first legitimate ray of light in Gotham in decades,” going on to tell him that he plans to 
turn himself in, unmask himself to the public. “Gotham is in your hands now,” he tells 
Dent. But the problem soon becomes clear: Dent alone is not enough. He himself realizes 
that the city needs the Batman, and gives himself over, claiming he is the Batman, to 
protect the real Batman’s (Bruce Wayne’s) identity. 
The two work in conjunction to further the essence of justice and the rule of law, 
despite arguably working against it. This apparent paradox can be resolved partly by 
accepting the Schmittian framework of the exception. But even without thinking of this in 
terms of the exception, it is clear that the two ideals have been reconciled to meet a 
specific end: in this case, the furtherance of justice. And in this case, it is not a simple act 
of working against the rule of law, as one might argue in the case of President Bush. 
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Rather, Batman works in conjunction with the law, with the legal system, while at the 
same time existing and acting outside of it. In other words, Batman gives a force to the 
law that does not otherwise have a presence in just Dent alone. By extension, we can 
apply the same logic using Gordon. The police do not possess the force of law necessary 
to make its applicability truly enforceable. 
 The Dark Knight complicates this concept of reconciliation and supplementation 
in its treatment of Dent. Eventually, he becomes the villain Two-Face, having been 
burned by the Joker and his lover, Rachel Dawes killed. In his rage, he succumbs to the 
temptation of illegality, killing those he feels are responsible for her death. The corrupt 
cops who betrayed him, the mobsters who set him up, etc. Faced with the consequences 
of enforcing the rule of law, he breaks, and with it, the symbolic nature of what the rule 
of law represents to the people. The order established by the rule of law is thrown out the 
window, and the extreme results of violence’s marriage to it come to the foreground. Yet 
some rule of law protections must stay in place, or the city really will fall into a destitute, 
chaos-ridden state – one akin to what the city looked like before Bruce Wayne created the 
Batman.170 Without Dent, what does the city have left? Is the ability to reconcile the rule 
of law with extralegal action still a choice? Or, without Dent, does the city in fact simply 
succumb to the whims of a vigilante? 
 First, we must consider the fact that Commissioner Gordon still plays a pivotal 
role. He can, in some way, play the role that Dent did, keeping the Batman in check, 
making sure that his extralegal actions are tempered with a legal outlet. Second, we must 
remember that the Batman, unlike a villain such as the Joker, has a code of morals by 
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which he lives. He exists and continues to fight for justice partly because legal avenues 
are available – they are just not as effective as they should be. He does not kill, even 
when tempted. Given the opportunity to kill the Joker – or simply let him fall to his death 
– at the end of the film, he instead decides to give him to the police.171 
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3.8 Printing the Legend of Gotham’s White Knight 
 
 I spoke previously in Chapter 2 of the way in which the “legend” was printed, 
rather than the truth, in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance. “Printing the legend” has the 
effect of allowing the people to live in a society believing that the rule of law exists 
separate from violence and arbitrary action. Yet as Liberty Valance demonstrates, the 
creation of a rule of law system requires some form of extralegality in its formation. The 
question The Dark Knight confronts is whether such action is still needed in a state in 
which a rule of law system is, for all intents and purposes, in place. Even within an 
emergency, do the people still need to believe that the rule of law exists untainted by 
violence and illegality? I believe that The Dark Knight answers this with a resounding 
“yes.” 
 At the end of the film, Harvey Dent, now the villain Two-Face, kidnaps 
Commissioner Gordon’s son and threatens to kill him in front of Gordon as revenge for 
what he feels is Gordon’s culpability in Rachel’s death. But Dent is killed, leaving the 
Batman and Gordon to clean up and decide what to do. If they release the facts to the 
public, they reason, Dent’s legacy, and with it the rule of law that he worked so hard to 
establish, would be for naught. Not only would the criminals Dent put away have grounds 
to appeal, but the people’s faith in the system would derail as well. 
 This leaves them with a choice between presenting the facts of Dent’s fate – that 
he became a monster like those he once fought against, like the Joker – or show him as 
the symbol of law and order that the people of Gotham so desire, and that the city so 
needs. Yet the only way to do that is to lay the blame of Two-Face’s murders on the 
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Batman, the moral agent able to shoulder the burden of that which the people cannot. In 
essence, they choose to “print the legend” of the White Knight of Gotham in the same 
way that the legend was printed to give legitimacy to Ranse Stoddard’s place as Senator 
and possible Vice President. In the same way that the burden of extralegality was on the 
shoulders of Tom Doniphon in Liberty Valance, here Batman carries it. Furthermore, we 
must remember that Batman is, in the end, just a man – Bruce Wayne – like most others. 
Though presented with superhuman abilities, the film never lets us forget that he is, in the 
end, as fragile as every last one of us. 
 The end result of both films speaks to the need of violence – extralegal measures 
– and the rule of law to somehow negotiate the terms of their existences. Neither one can 
efficiently deal with creating, or maintaining, the rule of law. Despite the supposed 
opposing concepts of rule of law and violence, we see here more of a marriage of the two. 
The Dark Knight, coupled with The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, give us a picture not 
of opposing forces, but of deeply interconnected ones. 
 What is seen here is a dependency by the rule of law on extralegal action to back 
it up and give it force. That force comes from the merging of traditional rule of law 
mechanisms with arbitrary action. Essentially, rather than working to dismantle the rule 
of law, that arbitrary action works instead to further, or strengthen it. Furthermore, the 
only real way in which this can work properly is if the truths of that strength are kept 
from the people through the use of “printing the legend.” The people want to believe in 
the rule of law as it would exist in a utopian society. Unfortunately, we do not live in 
such a society, and as such, perhaps we would be better to accept the realities of the 
world we live in. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
4.0 Problems, Wishes, and Shortcomings 
 
 
 The themes, ideas, and questions I have explored in this thesis have been broad, 
far-reaching, and expansive. They are ones that, even given the length and depth of some 
of the books I have analyzed among these pages, would not suffice to come to a 
satisfactory conclusion. It is not without regret that I am unable to do so, but it is with 
acceptance than such a task is difficult, if not impossible. This is especially true given the 
constraints with which I have worked regarding variables such as resources and time. 
Given the ability to do more with the subjects I have laid out in the previous pages, there 
is much more I would like to do. Regardless, I believe that the overall framework I have 
established – of using film to explore questions of politics, the rule of law, and to some 
extent, social identity – holds up under stricter scrutiny. It is my earnest belief that film 
can enlighten us in ways the deep legal and political debates of theorists like David 
Dyzenhaus and Giorgio Agamben can only hope to. 
 There are a multitude of questions within both The Man Who Shot Liberty 
Valance and The Dark Knight that I did not have the opportunity to explore. One example 
is the idea of Batman as an arm of the executive. Does he, by virtue of working in 
conjunction with Gordon and Dent, essentially become no more than a pawn of the 
executive’s desire for extralegal action? Or what of a closer look at the relationship 
between the Batman and the Joker? The idea that one exists only because the other does 
is pervasive within the film, and widely seen by many who have watched it. What are the 
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larger implications of this if we see them as metaphorical aspects of a post-9/11 world? 
Do the extralegal measures that Batman uses cause more harm than good, even if we 
accept that they are required? These are just a couple of the possible angles I was unable 
to fully explore in The Dark Knight. 
 In the case of Liberty Valance, what role does Hallie play? Joshua Dienstag 
speaks to this point as I briefly mentioned in Chapter 2. Looking at her as the demos like 
he does lends more credibility and force to the relationship of American identity to that of 
the rule of law and states of exception. In addition, the place of education within an 
ordered state seems apparently important. In Liberty Valance, an entire scene is devoted 
to Ransom Stoddard educating the town’s people on the United States, the constitution, 
and the rule of law. What implications does this have for the foundation of the rule of law 
within society? What part does education play in a state of exception? Again, these are 
just a couple of the ways in which I could, but was unable to, extend upon and further 
explore the material, here in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance. 
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4.1 Extensions Through Media 
 
 It is difficult to overemphasize the amount to which concepts of the rule of law 
and states of exception pervade media of all kinds, from television to film, even to video 
games. Its pervasiveness makes it difficult to avoid stumbling upon characters regularly 
faced with the choice of sacrificing the rule of law for safety and security within a state, 
and struggling over the extent to which they can balance these two competing ideals. 
 Television shows like Battlestar Galactica (2004)172 openly deal with concepts of 
founding a rule of law system, the competition between safety and liberty, and the way in 
which violence is never far apart from the attempt to instill the rule of law and reconcile 
these elements. Video games like Mass Effect (2007)173 force us to question the extent to 
which we as individuals are willing to go, and to what extent we are willing to personally 
sacrifice ourselves, for the greater good. And other films, like the multitude of Westerns 
by John Ford and others, as well as films like Children of Men (2006)174 and Minority 
Report (2002)175 delve deeply into the efficacy and state of being within an “exceptional” 
state, or state of emergency. The practical, the theoretical, and the aesthetic are all 
important ways by which to analyze the political. It is my belief that all of the above, and 
then some, should be under consideration as we as a society and a polity, continue to 
move forward, evolve, and grow. 
All of these points and questions are only a few of the possible ways to confront 
and explore some of the deeper and larger issues within the overall scope of this thesis. It 
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is with some regret and apology that I was not able to do so in this case. Yet all works are 
works in progress, and I believe must be seen as such. To relate this point to a well-
known story from the world of cinema, it has been told that Stanley Kubrick, always the 
perfectionist and never one to truly call a project “complete,” personally went to theaters 
to remove the last five minutes of The Shining (1980),176 deciding after its original 
release that he no longer wanted the film to end that way. Such an extreme example of 
editing and revising one’s work up until the last minute is not lost on me, and yet there is 
only so much I was able to accomplish. But let this point not detract from that which I did 
accomplish. 
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4.2 Summary Observations 
 
 As I have said, I believe that the use of film within political discussion as I have 
done here is not only important, but also essential. What can we take away from what I 
have written here? Firstly, using these two films as examples, we can see a thread of 
relation between their conclusions on the connection between the rule of law and 
violence. The connection is intrinsic. We can then take away from this that the rule of law 
depends upon violence to exist. As we see in both Liberty Valance and The Dark Knight, 
the use of violence is not outwardly condoned, and yet it is portrayed as being required. 
Furthermore, the rule of law is exhibited in both films as being of the utmost importance 
to an ordered society. Without the rule of law, society as we know it collapses. 
 The concept of the state of exception only exacerbates the idea that the rule of law 
is needed. For without it, villains like the Joker and Liberty Valance have no restraint. 
The exception reveals the need to which the rule of law is not only needed, but the extent 
to which the rule of law must find reconciliation with violent or arbitrary action. This is 
not to argue that we must simply condone and accept such action. But the films I have 
looked at certainly seem to agree that some kind of reconciliation must take place 
between the two. 
 How can this reconciliation happen? The films propose an idea: hide the intrinsic 
interconnection between the rule of law and violence to give the people a sense of 
legitimacy in the rule of law, even within times in which that interconnection is ever 
more present and apparent. “Printing the legend,” as Liberty Valance suggests, allows us 
to live with the fact that arbitrary action was required to produce an ordered society. The 
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Dark Knight seems to propose the idea that hiding, or at least minimizing, the visible 
relationship between the two, allows the people to deal with the sacrifices that must at 
times be made. 
 The deeper implications of these concluding thoughts from both films are both 
enlightening and frightening. It is my personal opinion that the protection of civil rights 
and the upholding of the rule of law are of the utmost importance. And yet in my 
exploration of such issues in this thesis, I am left somewhat disquieted, for it seems as if 
Carl Schmitt was more correct that many would like to admit. That is not to say that 
dictatorship is the answer, but simply that democracy in its ideal state of freedom and 
justice is more of a utopia than it is an attainable political reality. I admit that such an 
outlook could be considered cynical to some, but I believe that rather than cynicism, I am 
tapping into a pragmatism that seems lost on some. 
 As a final thought, I leave you, dear reader, with the following, courtesy of 
Jacques Derrida, from his essay, Force of Law:  
 
What is a legitimate fiction? What does it mean to found 
the truth of justice? These are among the questions that 
await us. Montaigne proposed an analogy between this 
supplement of a legitimate fiction, that is, the fiction 
necessary to found the truth of justice, and the supplement 
of artifice called for by a deficiency in nature, as if the 
absence of natural law called for the supplement of 
historical or positive (that is to say, an addition of fictional) 
law just as—and that is the proximity proposed by 
Montaigne—“(Even as women, when their natural teeth 
faile them, use some of yvorie, and in stead of a true 
beautie, or lively colour, law-on artificiall hew…embellish 
themselves with counterfeit and borrowed beauties; so doth 
learning (and our law hath, as some say, certain lawfull 
fictions, on which it groundeth the truth of justice.)”.177 
 
                                                 
177
 Derrida, Force of Law, 939, 941 
  
 
Here, we can see the cold greys of the present in Shinbone.
The dark of night as the film 
Images 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
switches to flashback. 
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Stoddard is placed off screen while the outlaw Liberty Valance violently whips him.
We see Stoddard in the distance holding a gun while Tom Doniphon waits to shoot 
Liberty Valance from the dark alleyway.
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
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The Bat Signal being destroyed. Its symbolism representative of the need for and 
 
Harvey Dent, transformed into the villain and murderer Two
representation of the dual
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
legitimation of the exception. 
 
FIGURE 6 
-Face, his physical duality a 
 nature of light and dark throughout The Dark Knight
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A victim of the Joker, the intimidating tape of his torture released to the media and 
The Joker hangs upside down, his life saved by the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7 
broadcast on television. 
 
 
FIGURE 8 
Batman to be turned in to the police.
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